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NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

**IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT**

STEVE HOUSTON,)	Appeal from the
)	Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellant,)	Cook County.
)	
v.)	No. 07 CH 15363
)	
ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTHCARE)	
& FAMILY SERVICES,)	The Honorable
)	Martin S. Agran,
Defendant-Appellee.)	Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Cunningham and Connors concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

HELD: Plaintiff challenged the decision of the Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services to enforce its automatic lien on his bank account. We hold that the Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services properly enforced its lien against plaintiff's bank account.

¶ 1 Plaintiff, Steve Houston, challenged the decision of the Illinois Department of Healthcare

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and Family Services (DHFS) to enforce the automatic lien it placed on his bank account. The lien was automatically placed on Houston's bank account due to a June 1998, judicial default order for child support arrearage. See 305 ILCS 5/10-25.5; 89 Ill. Adm. Code 160.170(g) (2011).

¶ 2 DHFS discovered the funds in Houston's bank account pursuant to a data matching agreement with financial institutions. See 305 ILCS 5/10-24.5 (West 2008). DHFS sustained its original determination and Houston sought administrative review in the circuit court of Cook County.

¶ 3 The circuit court affirmed DHFS's decision to enforce its lien on Houston's bank account, but remanded the cause back to DHFS to determine the proper amount of the lien. On remand, DHFS entered a second final administrative decision finding that Houston owed \$7,954.79, plus interest, in past due child support. DHFS included the calculations it used to determine that amount in its decision. The circuit court denied Houston's petition for administrative review and affirmed DHFS's decision.

¶ 4 On appeal, Houston raises the following issues: (1) whether DHFS had jurisdiction to enter its second final administrative decision on June 3, 2008; (2) whether DHFS violated Houston's due process rights; (3) whether the June 2, 1998, default judgment entered by the circuit court against Houston precludes DHFS from asserting any claims against him; and (4) whether DHFS had jurisdiction to enter its final administrative decision on May 16, 2007.¹ We

¹Houston, in his opening brief, listed five issues under the heading "Issues Presented For Review." However, in arguing his first issue, he raises five unrelated issues as subheadings.

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hold that DHFS had jurisdiction to enter its second final administrative decision on June 3, 2008.

We also hold that Houston has waived his due process and jurisdiction arguments because he failed to cite relevant authority to support his position.

¶ 5 JURISDICTION

¶ 6 In June and September of 2008, Houston prematurely filed notices of appeal. DHFS motioned to dismiss the case before this court for lack of jurisdiction, or in the alternative, require Houston to demonstrate entry of a final judgment. On May 21, 2009, this court denied DHFS's motion to dismiss, but granted its motion in the alternative to suspend proceedings to require Houston to demonstrate entry of a final judgment. On August 24, 2008, Houston filed a "Motion for Determination of a Final Order" before the circuit court. On September 4, 2009, upon the renewed motion of DHFS to dismiss Houston's appeal for lack of jurisdiction and Houston's motion for additional time, this court dismissed Houston's appeal because the circuit court had not reviewed DHFS's second final administrative decision.

¶ 7 On December 2, 2009, the circuit court denied Houston's "Motion for Determination of a Final Order," finding that its May 30, 2008, order was not a final order because it did not dispose of all of the issues between the parties. On March 8, 2010, the circuit court affirmed DHFS's June 3, 2008 final administrative decision and denied Houston's petition for administrative review of that decision.

Including these five subheadings, our review of his brief shows that he has raised ten issues for appeal. For reasons discussed later in this order, we will only be addressing the four issues listed above.

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¶ 8 On April 5, 2010, Houston filed both a motion for reconsideration of the circuit court's March 8, 2010, order affirming the final decision of DHFS and his notice of appeal. The notice of appeal was assigned appeal number 1-10-1300. Houston's notice of appeal was held in abeyance under Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(2) because the last postjudgment motion had not been disposed of by the circuit court. Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(a)(2) (eff. June 4, 2008). On June 2, 2010, the circuit court denied Houston's motion to reconsider. On that same day, Houston filed a second notice of appeal, which was assigned appeal number 1-10-1706. On August 19, 2010, this court consolidated appeal numbers 1-10-1300 and 1-10-1706. Accordingly, this court has jurisdiction pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rules 301 and 303 governing appeals from final judgments entered below. Ill. S. Ct. R. 301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994); R. 303 (eff. May 30, 2008).

¶ 9 **BACKGROUND**

¶ 10 Houston, the noncustodial father of a son born in 1979, was obligated to pay child support payments for his son. Houston's child support payments were assigned to DHFS by operation of law because Houston's son and the child's mother received cash assistance from the State of Illinois. See 305 ILCS 5/10-1 (West 2008); 89 Ill. Admin. Code 160.20(a)(2011). On June 2, 1998, a default order was entered against Houston in the amount of \$12,564, and \$50 a month was ordered to be withheld from his wages.²

² Houston filed a motion to vacate the default judgment the next day, but the record does not contain any evidence of a ruling on this motion by the court. Houston filed an account adjustment review in August of 2001 that temporarily stayed the withholding. In February of 2004, the circuit court issued an order finding that Houston failed to appear on an unidentified motion. There is no other evidence in the record that Houston challenged the June 2, 1998, default order against him.

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¶ 11 In February of 2006, DHFS served a notice of lien on LaSalle Bank seeking to levy funds of Houston's in LaSalle Bank's possession. DHFS discovered Houston's funds were being held by LaSalle Bank due to a data matching agreement with state financial institutions. See 305 ILCS 5/10-24.5 (West 2008). The notice of lien stated that the action was being taken according to a child support order entered on February 24, 2003, and that as of January 31, 2006, \$8,168.42, plus possible interest, was due and owing. The notice of lien also provided that the bank was authorized to charge a processing fee up to \$50 and that the owner of the account, Houston, could prevent the action by paying the past due support in full or by requesting an administrative hearing. Houston requested a hearing by certified mail on February 27, 2006, which DHFS received on March 2, 2006. DHFS sent a notice of stay, pending a hearing, to LaSalle Bank.

¶ 12 On June 1, 2006, hearing officer Maria Plascencia conducted a hearing between DHFS and Houston. Richard Falen represented DHFS as the enforcement officer. Initially, Houston stated that he had not seen the order that had been entered on February 24, 2003, and which the notice of lien listed as the order it was based on. Falen informed the hearing officer that the actual date of the circuit court order was June 2, 1998, and that DHFS wished to amend the lien on its face. DHFS argued that the Administrative Code does not require that the correct date of the entry of the order, in which they base their enforcement of the lien on, has to be on the notice of lien. As exhibits, DHFS presented the notice of lien, the judicial default order dated June 2, 1998, which the lien was based on, payment history summaries, a pre-conversion financial detail report, recipient ledgers, and support calculation worksheets. DHFS then asked that Houston's

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appeal be denied and rested its case-in-chief, reserving the right to present rebuttal testimony. Houston maintained that his due process rights were violated because DHFS failed to provide him notice before freezing his bank account. Houston also argued that he complied with the June 2, 1998, order of the circuit court by paying \$50 per month. Houston also argued that he thought there were orders entered in the circuit court after June 2, 1998, that had a bearing on his case, and requested a continuation of the matter to allow him time to obtain such orders. The hearing officer allowed Houston's request.

¶ 13 The next hearing, on September 15, 2006, occurred before a different hearing officer, Beverly Jackson, and DHFS was represented by a different enforcement officer, Tunisia Jackson. At this hearing, Houston maintained that he did not owe the amount due and that he did not receive proper notice. DHFS presented the exhibits from the previous hearing, including the June 2, 1998, default order against Houston which DHFS based its lien on. As in the previous hearing, Houston stated that the lien was based on a order dated February 23, 2003. Neither party nor the hearing officer mentioned that at the last hearing, Mr. Falen had informed hearing officer Plascencia that the lien was based on the June 2, 1998, default order, not the February 23, 2003, order. Hearing officer Jackson then indicated that she needed the 2003 order which the lien was based on and continued the case until Mr. Falen, who was at the initial hearing, would be present.

¶ 14 Both parties admit that additional hearings occurred on December 15, 2006, and February 14, 2007, but dispute what happened at those hearings. Houston argues that no hearing officer was present on December 15, 2006. He argues that on February 14, 2007, the hearing officer

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indicated that she had to leave before the proceedings were completed, which resulted in the continuance. DHFS argues that there is no evidence that it caused the December 15, 2006, hearing to be continued. DHFS argues that the February 14, 2007, hearing was continued because Houston had to go to another appointment. Both parties admit there is no transcript of either hearing. A letter sent from a senior assistant Attorney General in the Welfare Litigation Bureau to Houston explained that there were not any transcripts of the hearings. The letter stated that the assistant Attorney General contacted the administrative hearings bureau who informed him that no transcript exists for either hearing and that the bureau was unsure as to what happened on December 15, 2006. The letter indicated that, based on the hearing officer's notes, the February 14, 2007, hearing was continued because they ran out of time. The letter stated that "[t]he Bureau believed that pre-hearing conferences with [DHFS] occurred on those dates, rather than hearings." The transcript of the April 10, 2007, hearing provided some indication of what might have happened at the February 14, 2007, hearing. On that transcript, Mr. Falen representing DHFS, stated to the hearing officer that the hearing was continued because Houston had to go to another appointment. Houston did not object to Mr. Falen's statement.

¶ 15 On April 10, 2007, the hearing proceeded, this time in front of hearing officer Plascencia. DHFS was represented by Richard Falen. At this hearing, Houston tendered the hearing officer a circuit court order, entered February 24, 2003. The hearing officer read the order, which stated that Houston did not appear in court on a motion and that said motion was stricken with leave to reinstate. The hearing officer asked Houston whether he had been to court or had a court order showing that the June 2, 1998, order was stricken, to which Houston replied that he did not.

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Houston also questioned the fairness of the Administrative review process, which included arguing that his hearing was scheduled over 90 days after he had requested it.

¶ 16 On May 16, 2007, DHFS sent Houston a letter stating it had reviewed his petition and adopted the findings of fact of the hearing officer and issued its final administrative decision. It attached a copy of its final administrative decision, which contained two parts. The first part contained the findings of fact of the hearing officer, which DHFS considered and adopted, and the final administrative decision. Hearing officer Plascencia found that Houston had a default order entered against him on June 2, 1998, in the amount of \$12,564. The June 2, 1998, order ordered Houston to pay \$50 per month towards the default judgment against him and noted that the support payments would terminate on October 22, 1997. The termination date would not apply to any arrearage that remained unpaid. Plascencia found that on September 14, 2002, the circuit court entered an agreed order which temporarily stayed the levy on Houston's wages and that on February 24, 2003, the circuit court issued an order that Houston failed to appear on his own motion. The order struck the motion with leave to reinstate. Plascencia found no other evidence was available that related to Houston's support obligations, or any evidence of any orders that modified or superceded the June 2, 1998, default judgment against Houston. Plascencia found that DHFS sent a notice of lien to Houston, on February 24, 2003, stating that as of January 31, 2006, he owed past-due child support of \$8,168.42, and that DHFS intended to collect this amount by placing a lien on his assets. Plascencia found Houston requested a hearing by certified mail on February 27, 2006, which was received by DHFS on March 2, 2006.

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¶ 17 In the second part of its final administrative decision, DHFS concluded that based on the findings of fact of the hearing officer, jurisdiction was proper. DHFS found that based on the June 2, 1998, judicial default arrears order, Houston owed \$7,955.06 as of April 30, 2006, plus any applicable interest.

¶ 18 On June 29, 2007, Houston filed his amended complaint for administrative review in the circuit court of Cook County pursuant to the Administrative Review Act. 735 ILCS 5/3-101 *et seq.* (West 2008). The circuit court heard oral argument on the fully briefed motion. On May 30, 2008, the circuit court issued its memorandum opinion finding DHFS properly placed a lien on Houston's account, but the court remanded the matter, directing the hearing officer to determine the proper amount of the lien including the method used to calculate the lien.

¶ 19 On June 3, 2008, on remand, DHFS issued an amended final administrative decision which explained its calculation of the arrearage Houston owed as of April 30, 2006, which it found to be \$7,955.06, plus applicable interest.

¶ 20 At this point in the proceedings it does not appear that the circuit court had reviewed DHFS's amended final decision. Matters were further complicated because on June 27, 2008, Houston filed both a motion to reconsider before the circuit court and a notice of appeal.

¶ 21 On September 8, 2008, the circuit court denied Houston's motion to reconsider finding it did not have jurisdiction to hear Houston's motion because of the notice of appeal he filed. The circuit court stated further that "Even if this court had jurisdiction, [Houston's] motion is denied because [Houston] failed to meet the prerequisites for a motion to reconsider." On September 26, 2008, Houston filed a second notice of appeal.

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¶ 22 On May 21, 2009, this court denied DHFS's motion to dismiss Houston's appeal, but granted DHFS's motion to suspend proceedings and require Houston to demonstrate entry of a final judgment.

¶ 23 On August 24, 2009, defendant filed a motion for determination of a final order before the circuit court.

¶ 24 On September 4, 2009, this court granted DHFS's renewed motion to dismiss Houston's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. In doing so, this court concluded the record contained no order indicating the circuit court reviewed DHFS's new final administrative decision dated June 3, 2008.

¶ 25 On December 2, 2009, the circuit court found that its May 30, 2008, order affirming DHFS's decision, but remanding the case for the proper calculation of the lien amount was not a final order and denied defendant's motion for a determination of a final order.

¶ 26 On January 20, 2010, defendant filed another petition for administrative review, seeking review of DHFS's amended final administrative decision filed June 3, 2008, arguing that DHFS lacked jurisdiction to file an amended final administrative final order and asked that the circuit court either reverse DHFS's decision or modify the decision, after a proper calculation, to determine what was owed. On March 8, 2010, the circuit court entered an order denying Houston's petition for administrative review. On April 5, 2010, Houston filed both a motion to reconsider the court's March 8, 2010, order and a notice of appeal. On June 2, 2010, the circuit court denied Houston's motion to reconsider. That same day, Houston filed another notice of appeal asking this court to reverse the circuit court orders of June 2, 2010, March 8, 2010, and

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May 30, 2008.

¶ 27

ANALYSIS

¶ 28 Initially, we note that although Houston listed only five issues under the heading "Issues Presented for Review," his brief actually contains a total of ten issues for review. However, six of those ten address alleged errors made by the circuit court.³ We will not address Houston's arguments regarding the circuit court because this case is before us on administrative review. As such, we review the administrative agency's decision, not the judgment of the circuit court.

Marconi v. Chicago Heights Police Pension Board, 225 Ill. 2d 497, 531 (2006) ("in administrative cases, our role is to review the decision of the administrative agency, not the determination of the circuit court."). Houston's arguments concerning the conduct of the circuit court have no bearing on our decision.

¶ 29 The issues properly before this court are whether DHFS had jurisdiction to enter its second final administrative decision on June 3, 2008; whether DHFS violated Houston's due process rights; whether the June 2, 1998, default judgment entered by the circuit court against Houston precludes DHFS from asserting any legal claims against him; and whether DHFS had

³ The issues Houston raises that pertain solely to the conduct of the circuit court are: (1) whether the circuit court used the incorrect standard of review; (2) whether the circuit court overlooked factual evidence in the record; (3) whether the circuit court erred in not determining that DHFS's decision was arbitrary; (4) whether the "Memorandum Opinion" entered by the circuit court on May 30, 2008, was a final order; (5) whether the circuit court erred in not addressing the constitutional issues Houston raised; and (6) whether the circuit court erred in finding that it did not have jurisdiction to hear Houston's motion for reconsideration.

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jurisdiction to enter its final Administrative decision on May 16, 2007.

¶ 30 Houston sought administrative review pursuant to the Administrative Review Act (735 ILCS 5/3-101 *et seq.* West 2008), which provides that the scope of our review:

“shall extend to all questions of law and fact presented by the entire record before the court. No new or additional evidence in support of or in opposition to any finding, order, determination or decision of the administrative agency shall be heard by the court. The findings and conclusions of the administrative agency on questions of fact shall be held to be prima facie true and correct.”

735 ILCS 5/3-110 (West 2008).

The amount of deference we must give to the decision of the DHFS “depends upon whether the question presented is a question of fact, a question of law, or a mixed question of law and fact.” *Marconi*, 225 Ill. 2d at 532. When reviewing questions of fact, the reviewing court must determine whether the decision of the agency is against the manifest weight of the evidence. *Id.* Questions of law, however, are reviewed *de novo*. *Id.* When the question presented is a mixed question of law and fact, the clearly erroneous standard is applied. *Id.* The plaintiff bears the burden of proof in an administrative proceeding. *Id.* at 532-33. On administrative review, it is not the function of this court to make independent factual determinations or to reweigh evidence. *Kouzoukas v. Retirement Board of the Policeman's Annuity and Benefit Fund of the City of Chicago*, 234 Ill. 2d 446, 463 (2009).

¶ 31 In this case, our review of the record shows that we cannot say that the decision of DHFS

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was against the manifest weight of the evidence. DHFS placed a lien on Houston's bank account in order to collect past due child support pursuant to the Public Aid Code. 305 ILCS 5/10-25.5 (West 2008); 89 Ill. Adm. Code 160.70 (2011). The Public Aid Code provides that "the State shall have a lien on all legal and equitable interests of responsible relatives in their personal property, including any account in a financial institution." 305 ILCS 5/10-25.5 (West 2008). A financial institution is defined as " a depository institution, which is any bank or saving association." 305 ILCS 5/10-14 (West 2008). The Public Aid Code defines "account" as "a demand deposit account, checking or negotiable withdrawal order account, savings account, time deposit account, or money market mutual fund account." 305 ILCS 5/10-24 (West 2008). Under the Illinois Administrative Code, DHFS is required to impose a lien on personal property of responsible relatives with past due child support under the following circumstances:

"A) The Department shall impose liens against personal property of responsible relatives *** in accordance with Article X of the Illinois Public Aid Code when the following circumstances exist"

- I) the amount of past due support is at least \$1,000
- ii) the responsible relative has an interest in personal property against which a lien may be claimed; and
- iii) if the personal property to be levied is an account as defined in Section 10-24 of the Illinois Public Aid Code [305 ILCS 5/10-24], the account is valued in the amount of

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at least \$300." 89 Ill. Adm. Code 160.70 (f)(2)(A) (I-iii)
(2011).

¶ 32 DHFS found that on June 2, 1998, Houston had a default judgment entered against him for past due child support. DHFS found no evidence that the June 2, 1998, order was modified or superceded by any subsequent orders of the circuit court. DHFS also found that Houston owed over \$1,000 in past due child support and had a bank account valued in the amount of at least \$300. Based on the record before us, we cannot say DHFS's factual determinations are against the manifest weight of the evidence. DHFS, pursuant to the Public Aid Code and the Illinois Administrative Code, properly placed a lien on Houston's account. Houston had the burden of proving otherwise, but failed to do so. *Marconi*, 225 Ill. 2d at 532-33 (The plaintiff bears the burden of proof in an administrative proceeding).

¶ 33 Houston argues DHFS lacked jurisdiction to enter an adverse decision against him on June 3, 2008. As a question of law, we review his contention *de novo*. *Id.* at 532. In this case, the circuit court affirmed DHFS's decision to place the lien on Houston's bank account, but issued a limited remand, instructing the hearing officer to determine the proper amount of the lien. The circuit court also ordered that the hearing officer "include the method for arriving at the final total" as the amount of the lien was unclear. Section 3-11 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure allows a circuit court on administrative review "to reverse and remand the decision in whole or part, and, in that case, to state the questions requiring further hearing or proceedings and to give such other instructions as may be proper." 735 ILCS 5/3-111 (West 2008). DHFS entered their June 3, 2008, order on remand from the circuit court determining the proper amount

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of the lien.

¶ 34 We hold that Houston's argument that DHFS lacked jurisdiction to enter its June 3, 2008, decision is without merit. The circuit court, as it is permitted to do under section 3-111 of the Code, remanded the case to DHFS for the hearing officer to provide a proper accounting of the lien. 735 ILCS 5/3-111 (West 2008). Houston claims the order was *ex parte*, however the circuit court's order clearly stated that the hearing officer was to determine the proper amount of the lien and include the method used to calculate the lien. The order does not call for a rehearing of any sort. Houston does not cite any authority to show that DHFS did not have jurisdiction to follow the circuit court's instructions on remand.

¶ 35 Houston next argues that DHFS denied him his right to procedural due process by not issuing its decision within 90 days of his request for hearing. As a question of law, our review is *de novo*. *Marconi* 225 Ill. 2d at 532. Section 104.102(G) of the Illinois Administrative Code provides:

"(G) Following the hearing, the Director of the Department shall make a Final Administrative Decision. A copy of the decision shall be mailed to each interested party and the parties' representatives, if any, within 90 days after the Department's receipt of the request for hearing, extended by any delay caused by any party other than the Department. The Department shall take appropriate action implementing the results of the decision within 30 days after its release." 89 Ill. Adm. Code 104.102

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(2011).

¶ 36 DHFS received Houston's request for a hearing on March 1, 2006.⁴ DHFS issued its final administrative on May 16, 2007. DHFS conducted its initial hearing on June 1, 2006, which was 92 days after Houston's request. At the June 1, 2006, hearing, Houston requested a continuance, which the hearing officer granted. The second hearing, on September 15, 2006, was continued because Houston claimed that DHFS was missing the proper order which the lien was based on even though at the initial hearing DHFS amended the lien to state the proper default order. The September 15, 2006, hearing was conducted in front of a different hearing officer, and a different enforcement officer represented DHFS than had at the June 1, 2006, hearing which established the proper date of the default order the lien was based on. The parties dispute what happened at the December 15, 2006, and February 14, 2007, hearings. There is no transcript of either hearing.

¶ 37 Based on the evidence before us in the record, it is clear that DHFS was at least two days late in issuing its decision on June 1, 2006, before Houston requested a continuance; and an additional 36 days late after issuing its decision on May 16, 2007, after the April 10, 2007, hearing. DHFS was thus 38 days late in rendering its decision. The continuance ordered on September 15, 2006, appears to be because Houston created confusion as to the date of the default judgment the lien was based upon, even though DHFS had already established that the lien was based upon the default judgment of June 2, 1998. There are no transcripts of the

⁴DHFS admitted in its brief before this court that it received Houston's request for hearing on March 1, 2006.

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December 15, 2006, and February 14, 2007, hearings. Delays not attributable to DHFS are not counted against it. 89 Ill. Adm. Code 104.102(G) (2011). Based upon the evidence before us, we cannot say what caused the delay in proceedings outside of the 38 days attributable to DHFS.

¶ 38 Houston, as the appellant, carries the burden of presenting a sufficiently complete record to support his argument. *Foutch v. O'Bryant*, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92 (1984). This court has held that a failure to elaborate on an argument, cite persuasive authority, or present a well reasoned argument violates Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) and results in waiver of that argument. *Sakellariadas v. Campbell*, 391 Ill. App. 3d 795, 804 (2009) ("The failure to assert a well-reasoned argument supported by legal authority is a violation of Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7), resulting in waiver."); Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. July 1, 2008). Further, on administrative review, Houston, as the plaintiff, bears the burden of proof in an administrative proceeding. *Marconi* 225 Ill. 2d at 532-33.

¶ 39 Houston has failed to present a sufficient record, argument, or cite persuasive authority for this court to hold that his due process rights were violated. Specifically, he has not shown how the 38 day delay violated his right to due process. We note that although the record discloses that DHFS was 38 days late, "due process is a matter of federal constitutional law, so compliance or noncompliance with state procedural requirements is not determinative of whether minimum procedural due process standards have been met." *Lyon v. Department of Children and Family Services*, 209 Ill. 2d 264, 274 (2004). The record is not clear who is responsible for the numerous delays outside the 38 days attributable to DHFS. Houston has not shown in his

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briefs through citation to persuasive authority or the record how the 38 day delay violated his due process rights. We hold that Houston has waived his procedural due process argument because he has not presented a sufficient record nor articulated how the 38 day delay violated his right to procedural due process. *Sakellariadas*, 391 Ill. App. 3d at 804; Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. July 1, 2008).

¶ 40 Houston's final two arguments are that the June 2, 1998, default judgement against him, which DHFS based its lien on, precludes DHFS from asserting any claims against him; and that DHFS did not have jurisdiction to enter its final administrative decision on May 16, 2007. The June 2, 1998, default order stated that Houston was in arrears of his child support payments by \$12,564 and that the amount of \$50 per week would be withheld from his paycheck to satisfy his debt. We hold Houston has waived this argument because he has not cited any relevant authority to show that the June 2, 1998, default judgment precluded DHFS from enforcing its lien. *Sakellariadas*, 391 Ill. App. 3d at 804; Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. July 1, 2008). As shown above, DHFS placed a lien on Houston's account pursuant to the Public Aid Code. 305 ILCS 5/10-15.2 (West 2008). The June 2, 1998, default judgment is what DHFS based its lien on. Houston has failed to show how DHFS was precluded from doing so. Houston has also waived his argument that DHFS did not have jurisdiction to enter its May 16, 2007, final administrative decision. Houston has not cited any persuasive authority to show that DHFS did not have jurisdiction over the matter. *Sakellariadas*, 391 Ill. App. 3d at 804.

¶ 41

CONCLUSION

¶ 42 For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Illinois Department of Healthcare and

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Family Services is affirmed. The judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.

¶ 43 Affirmed.