FIFTH DIVISION
Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LUTHERAN SOCIAL SERVICES OF ILLINOIS,
INC., and NANCY GOLDEN, Defendants-Appellees. No. 93-L-11761 Honorable Richard E. Neville, Judge
Presiding. Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LUTHERAN SOCIAL SERVICES OF ILLINOIS,
INC., and NANCY GOLDEN, Defendants-Appellants. PRESIDING
JUSTICE THEIS delivered the opinion of the court: In 1993, plaintiff Steve Poulos brought suit
against defendants Nancy Golden and Lutheran Social Services of Illinois, Inc.,
a nonprofit social service agency, alleging false light and tortious
interference with a contractual relation. The matter was subsequently tried
before a jury, which returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff in the amount of
$219,000. Judgment was entered on that verdict in May 1998. Both plaintiff and defendants have
appealed. For the following reasons, we affirm in part,
reverse in part and remand for a trial on the issue of punitive
damages. BACKGROUND At trial, Katherine Poulos testified that she
and her husband, plaintiff Steve Poulos, became foster parents to two brothers
in 1985. Both children, R.F. and J.F., had severe emotional problems. In 1986,
Katherine and her husband added another foster child to their family. That
child, Daniel, was later adopted by Katherine and her husband in April
1987. As time passed, Katherine and her husband came
to the conclusion that they could not properly care for R.F. and J.F. According
to Katherine, both brothers were exhibiting behavioral problems that posed too
great a danger to Daniel. In March 1988, R.F. and J.F. were placed with other
foster families. On December 29, 1988, Joanne Deckman, an
investigator with the Department of Children and Family Services, informed
Katherine that her husband was being investigated in connection with allegations
of sexual abuse made against him by R.F., their former foster child. Katherine
stated that she and her husband immediately hired an attorney, who advised them
that Daniel should be examined by a physician. Daniel was seen by a physician
shortly thereafter, as was plaintiff. A few days later, Katherine learned that
one of the cultures taken from Daniel indicated the presence of gonorrhea.
Katherine had Daniel immediately reexamined. The results of the second
examination were in marked contrast to those of the original. Specifically, none
of the results of that second examination indicated the presence of gonorrhea.
Around that same time, Katherine also learned that gonorrhea had not been
detected during the examination of her husband. Nevertheless, Daniel was temporarily placed in
foster care and a petition to declare Daniel a ward of the court was filed on
his behalf. That petition was directed against Katherine and her husband and
centered around certain allegations of sexual abuse by the latter. Katherine and her husband met with defendant
Nancy Golden in January 1989. Golden was a social worker employed by defendant
Lutheran Social Services. She was assigned to monitor the foster care provided
to Daniel and to provide counseling and related services to Katherine and her
husband. According to Katherine, Golden told them they had to proceed under the
assumption that her husband was guilty in order to progress towards regaining
custody of Daniel. Katherine also testified that Golden told her, privately, she
would never see Daniel again if she did not divorce her husband. Katherine and her husband met with Golden again
in February 1989. Katherine told Golden that her husband was still employed and
teaching physical education at Francis W. Parker School. Golden appeared
surprised, stating, "[W]ell, if I was [sic] a parent, I wouldn't want
Steve around my child." Katherine reminded Golden that Francis Parker had
already made its decision, fully informed of the sexual abuse allegation against
her husband. According to Katherine, Golden replied, "[W]ell, we'll see about
that." Approximately two weeks later, plaintiff was
asked to take a paid leave of absence from Francis Parker, and he did so.
Plaintiff was terminated the following July. On December 26, 1989, after 11 months, the
wardship proceedings were dismissed, and Daniel was immediately returned to
Katherine and her husband. According to Katherine, Francis Parker did not
immediately rehire her husband. Rather, it conditioned such a return upon the
removal of his name from a list, maintained by the Department of Children and
Family Services, to which he had been added as a result of the allegations of
sexual abuse against him. Plaintiff met that condition and, in turn, was offered
a one-year contract. However, Katherine stated that her husband refused that
offer, after determining the conditions attached to it were
unacceptable. Defendant Nancy Golden testified that, upon
being assigned to monitor the foster care of Daniel, she reviewed the
allegations of sexual abuse against plaintiff. Golden learned that R.F. and J.F.
had severe emotional problems. She also learned that R.F. had recanted his
allegations of sexual abuse against plaintiff and that his brother, J.F., denied
those allegations in their entirety. Golden was also aware that Daniel had been
reexamined and found to be free of gonorrhea. Golden further testified that she
knew plaintiff had also tested negative for gonorrhea. Golden met with plaintiff and his wife on
February 17, 1989. During that meeting, she learned that plaintiff was still
teaching at Francis Parker. Golden denied she expressed any dissatisfaction with
that arrangement. However, Golden later testified that she was "greatly
concerned" with the safety of the students at Francis Parker following that
meeting. Golden next testified that, although she knew
Joanne Deckman had already informed Francis Parker of the sexual abuse
allegations against plaintiff, she decided to call the school herself. When her
calls went unreturned, Golden telephoned Harlene Matyas, a parent of a Francis
Parker student. According to Golden, she hoped Matyas could provide her with the
name of someone in authority at Francis Parker with whom she could speak. Golden
told Matyas that she was concerned about the students at Francis Parker because
a child belonging to plaintiff, a current teacher, had recently tested positive
for gonorrhea. Golden further testified that Matyas gave her
the telephone number of King Harris, then chairman of the board of trustees at
Francis Parker. Golden called Harris. She informed him of the
allegations of sexual abuse against plaintiff. She then told Harris that
plaintiff had a child, Daniel, who had recently tested positive for gonorrhea.
Golden also explained to Harris that plaintiff disputed the result of that
examination, insisting it was a false positive. Golden, however, did not tell
Harris that Daniel had been subsequently reexamined and found to be free of
gonorrhea. Golden did not inform Harris that plaintiff had also been examined
and had also been found free of gonorrhea. Golden did not reveal that R.F., the
former foster child who had accused plaintiff of sexual abuse, had severe mental
and emotional problems or that he had recanted his allegations. Neither did she
reveal that his brother, J.F., denied those allegations in their
entirety. Harlene Matyas followed Golden. Matyas testified
that, although unsure of the date, she received a telephone call from Golden in
which the latter expressed her concern for the students at Francis Parker.
According to Matyas, Golden told her plaintiff had a child who had recently
tested positive for gonorrhea. Golden also told her plaintiff was the only
possible source of that infectious disease. Matyas also testified that Golden did not ask
her for the name of someone in authority at Francis Parker, and Matyas further
denied giving Golden any such name. King Harris testified that, in February 1989, he
received a telephone call from Harlene Matyas. She told him of the sexual abuse
allegations against plaintiff. She also told him plaintiff allegedly forced a
former foster child to eat his own feces and that his own child recently tested
positive for gonorrhea. That same evening, Harris received a telephone
call from Nancy Golden. She also informed him of the allegations of sexual abuse
against plaintiff. Harris made notes of their conversation. With regard to the
results of the examination indicating the presence of gonorrhea in Daniel,
Harris noted, "Poulos claims false positive. Nancy Golden says definite
positive." Harris stated Golden "felt that people who were guilty of such child
abuse should not be teaching children." As a result of his conversations with Matyas and
Golden, and a subsequent telephone call from an assistant State's Attorney,
Harris called John Cotton, the principal at Francis Parker. Harris learned that
Cotton was aware of the sexual abuse allegations against plaintiff but had not
yet taken any action. Harris told Cotton that a response was required, and
recommended that plaintiff be placed on a paid leave of absence until the matter
was resolved. Harris testified that his recommendation was implemented, and
plaintiff was placed on a paid leave of absence for the remainder of the school
year. John Cotton testified that, in early January
1989, he received a telephone call from Joanne Deckman. She informed him that
the Department of Children and Family Services was investigating plaintiff in
connection with allegations of sexual abuse of a foster child. Cotton then met
with plaintiff. Following that meeting, Cotton determined that he would take no
action against plaintiff so long as the allegations did not become public.
Shortly thereafter, Cotton received a letter from Deckman, informing him that,
in the opinion of the Department of Children and Family Services, credible
evidence existed to support the allegations of sexual abuse against
plaintiff. In late February, the allegations of sexual
abuse against plaintiff became a matter of public knowledge. Cotton testified
that parents began calling him, demanding that plaintiff have no contact with
their children. Due to that outcry, Cotton determined that plaintiff should be
placed on a paid leave of absence for the remainder of the school year. Cotton
gave plaintiff until June to clear himself of the allegations against him. In
June, Cotton granted plaintiff an extension until July 1, 1989, the date by
which he needed finalized teaching contracts for the upcoming school year at
Francis Parker. However, Cotton also told plaintiff that, if he could not clear
himself of the allegations by that date, he would be terminated for
cause. Cotton terminated plaintiff as a teacher at
Francis Parker on July 18, 1989. Cotton stated that Harris had nothing to do
with that decision. However, Cotton conceded that, as principal, he answered to
Harris and that Harris would occasionally assist him with decisions. On December 26, 1989, several months later, the
circuit court dismissed the wardship proceedings, ruling that the allegations of
sexual abuse against plaintiff were unfounded. Daniel was immediately returned
to plaintiff and his wife. In February 1990, after learning the allegations
of sexual abuse against plaintiff had been dismissed, Cotton informed plaintiff
that any return to Francis Parker was conditioned upon the expungement of his
name from the list at the Department of Children and Family Services to which he
had been added as a result of the allegations of sexual abuse against him.
According to Cotton, plaintiff accomplished that by the following June. Cotton
testified he then offered to reinstate plaintiff as a teacher at Francis Parker,
but only on the condition that he agree to remediation. As Cotton explained,
remediation was a process in which a teacher was evaluated during the course of
a school year. Cotton denied the circuit court proceedings had anything to do
with his insistence that remediation be made a condition to any reinstatement of
plaintiff. After hearing all the evidence and arguments of
counsel, the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff, awarding him
$219,000 in compensatory damages. These appeals followed. DISCUSSION I Defendants initially contend the circuit court
erred in denying their motions for a directed verdict and judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. A circuit court properly enters a directed
verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict when the evidence, viewed in the
light most favorable to the nonmovant, so overwhelmingly favors the movant that
no contrary verdict could ever stand. Maple v. Gustafson, 151 Ill. 2d
445, 453, 603 N.E.2d 508, 512 (1992). However, where the resolution of factual
disputes or the assessment of witness credibility is critical to the outcome of
an action, a circuit court may not direct a verdict or grant a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. Maple, 151 Ill. 2d at 454, 603 N.E.2d at
512. The same standard is applied on appeal.
Bialek v. Moraine Valley Community College School District 524, 267
Ill. App. 3d 857, 860, 642 N.E.2d 825, 827 (1994). A Defendants specifically maintain plaintiff
failed to establish all of the elements in his action for false
light. In order to recover for false light, a plaintiff
must plead and prove (1) that defendant placed him in a false light before the
public, (2) that the false light in which he was placed would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person, and (3) that defendant acted with actual
malice. Kolegas v. Heftel Broadcasting Corp., 154 Ill. 2d 1, 17-18, 607
N.E.2d 201, 207 (1992). 1 Defendants first argue plaintiff failed to
establish he was placed in a false light before the public. What is sufficient to establish the element of
"before the public" in an action for false light has not yet been
decided by our supreme court. Nor has this court had the opportunity to address
that issue. However, this court has had occasion to address the element of
publicity in an action for public disclosure of private facts. E.g.,
Doe v. TCF Bank Illinois, FSB, 302 Ill. App. 3d 839, 841-43, 707 N.E.2d
220, 221-23 (1999); Roehrborn v. Lambert, 277 Ill. App. 3d 181, 184,
660 N.E.2d 180, 182 (1995); Miller v. Motorola, Inc., 202 Ill. App. 3d
976, 978-81, 560 N.E.2d 900, 902-03 (1990). Actions for false light and
public disclosure of private facts are closely related. Indeed, each is
considered to be an action for invasion of privacy. Lovgren v. Citizens
First National Bank of Princeton, 126 Ill. 2d 411, 416, 534 N.E.2d 987, 988
(1989). A comparison is therefore worthwhile. An action for public disclosure of private facts
provides a remedy for the dissemination of true, but highly offensive or
embarrassing, private facts. 1 M. Polelle & B. Ottley, Illinois Tort Law
§6.09 (2d ed. 1996). In order to recover under such an action, a plaintiff must
establish (1) that a defendant gave publicity to a private fact, (2) that such a
fact would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (3) that such a fact
was not of legitimate public concern. Miller, 202 Ill. App. 3d at
978-79, 560 N.E.2d at 902. The publicity element in an action for
public disclosure of private facts has been generally defined as communication
of a private fact "to the public at large, or to so many persons that the matter
must be regarded as substantially certain to become one of public knowledge."
Restatement (Second) of Torts §652D (1977). An exception does, however, exist.
In Illinois, the publicity element in an action for public disclosure of private
facts may be satisfied by establishing that a defendant disclosed highly
offensive private facts to a person or persons with whom a plaintiff has a
special relationship. Miller, 202 Ill. App. 3d at 979-81, 560 N.E.2d at
902-03. As reasoned by this court in Miller, the adoption of such an
exception is both justified and appropriate in that a disclosure to a limited
number of persons may be just as devastating to a plaintiff as a disclosure to
the general public. 202 Ill. App. 3d at 980-81, 560 N.E.2d at 903. The reasoning in Miller is sound. That
reasoning is also persuasive with regard to actions for false light. It is,
therefore, adopted. Accordingly, the element of "before the public" in
an action for false light may be satisfied by establishing that false and highly
offensive information was disclosed to a person or persons with whom a plaintiff
has a special relationship.(1) The evidence at trial established that Golden
telephoned Harris, then chairman of the board of trustees at Francis Parker, and
spoke to him about plaintiff, then a teacher at Francis Parker. The evidence
also established that the board of trustees was a "governance body responsible
for *** hiring the principal of the school and overseeing a wide variety of
matters." That evidence was sufficient to establish a special relationship
between plaintiff and Harris. 2 Defendants also argue plaintiff failed to
establish the statements made by Golden to Harris were false or that she acted
with actual malice. Plaintiff introduced evidence at trial that
Golden told Harris the examination result that indicated Daniel was infected
with gonorrhea was a "definite positive." The jury may well have interpreted
that statement as an assurance by Golden that there was absolutely no
possibility the aforementioned examination result was in error, thereby placing
plaintiff in a false light. The jury could well have determined as much in light
of the evidence that Daniel had been subsequently reexamined and found to be
free of gonorrhea. Evidence that plaintiff himself was examined and found to be
free of gonorrhea further supports the determination of the jury. Accordingly,
it cannot be said the determination of the jury was contrary to the evidence.
That determination, therefore, will not be disturbed. The jury also found defendants acted with actual
malice. With regard to actions for false light, actual
malice has been defined by our supreme court as knowledge that the statements
made by a defendant were false or that such statements were made with reckless
disregard as to their truth or falsity. Kolegas, 154 Ill. 2d at 17-18,
607 N.E.2d at 209-10. The evidence at trial established that Golden
knew about the result of the second examination of Daniel, which indicated he
was not infected with gonorrhea, before she telephoned Harris. Furthermore, the
evidence at trial established Golden was also aware plaintiff himself had been
examined and found to be free of gonorrhea before she telephoned Harris. That
evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiff, supports the
determination of the jury. There is no basis, therefore, to disturb that
determination. 3 Defendants also contend that plaintiff "failed
to meet his burden as to disclosure of facts about his 'private
life.'" (Emphasis in original.) According to defendants, the evidence at
trial established that "the information conveyed to [Harris]" by Golden had
already been made public by others as well as by plaintiff himself. At trial, plaintiff testified that, prior to the
telephone conversation between Golden and Harris, he told certain close friends
and family he had been accused of sexual abuse. Plaintiff also informed Cotton
of the allegations against him. However, plaintiff, at all times, categorically
denied the truth of those allegations. By voluntarily informing others of the sexual
abuse allegations against him, plaintiff may be said to have consented to the
publication of those allegations. Nevertheless, such consent may not be said to
constitute a license for defendants to publicize false and highly offensive
information. Anderson v. Low Rent Housing Comm'n, 304 N.W.2d 239,
250-51 (Iowa 1981). Accordingly, that Harris and others may have known
of the sexual abuse allegations against plaintiff is no defense to the actions
of defendants. 4 Defendants further contend plaintiff failed to
establish the allegations of sexual abuse against him were not of legitimate and
proper interest to Harris, then chairman of the board of trustees at Francis
Parker. There is no such element in an action for false
light. See Kolegas, 154 Ill. 2d at 17-18, 607 N.E.2d at 207. Moreover,
as previously noted, Harris had no legitimate and proper interest in learning
false and highly offensive information about plaintiff. B Defendants also maintain plaintiff failed to
establish all the elements of his action for tortious interference with a
contractual relation. Recovery under an action for tortious
interference with a contractual relation requires that a plaintiff plead and
prove (1) the existence of a valid and enforceable contract between the
plaintiff and a third party, (2) that defendant was aware of the contract, (3)
that defendant intentionally and unjustifiedly induced a breach of the contract,
(4) that the wrongful conduct of defendant caused a subsequent breach of the
contract by the third party, and (5) that plaintiff was damaged as a result.
Strosberg v. Brauvin Realty Services, Inc., 295 Ill. App. 3d 17, 32-33,
691 N.E.2d 834, 845 (1998). 1 Defendants specifically argue plaintiff failed
to establish Golden intentionally and unjustifiedly induced a breach of the
contract between himself and Francis Parker. At trial, plaintiff introduced evidence that
Golden not only placed him in a false light before Harris but that she also told
Harris, "[P]eople who were guilty of such child abuse should not be teaching
children." Plaintiff also introduced evidence that Golden told his wife,
"[W]ell, we'll see about that," upon learning Francis Parker had, at the time,
taken no action against him. Based upon that evidence, the jury could well
have found that Golden intentionally and unjustifiably induced a breach of the
contract between plaintiff and Francis Parker. Ramsey v. Greenwald, 91
Ill. App. 3d 855, 862-63, 414 N.E.2d 1266, 1272-73 (1980); see also Stewart
v. Ost, 142 Ill. App. 3d 373, 374, 491 N.E.2d 1306, 1307-08 (1986);
Powers v. Delnor Hospital, 135 Ill. App. 3d 317, 320-21, 481 N.E.2d
968, 970-71 (1985). 2 Defendants also argue no evidence was offered to
establish that Francis Parker breached its contract with plaintiff. According to
defendants, Francis Parker did not breach that contract because Cotton
terminated plaintiff for "cause." Defendants further maintain that, even if
Francis Parker was shown to have breached its contract with plaintiff, no
evidence was offered to establish that their actions caused such a
breach. The contract between Francis Parker and
plaintiff gave Cotton the authority to fire plaintiff for "cause." That
contract, however, did not define the term "cause." Cotton testified he
terminated plaintiff because the latter was unable to clear himself of the
sexual abuse allegations against him by July 1, 1989. The jury, as the ultimate
trier of fact, determined that the testimony of Cotton was not sufficient to
establish "cause." The jury did so by expressly finding, within a special
interrogatory, that the contract between plaintiff and Francis Parker was
wrongly breached. In so finding, the jury may well have concluded that, because
plaintiff had no meaningful control over the speed with which the allegations of
sexual abuse against him were adjudicated, his termination by Cotton was without
"cause" and, therefore, a breach of the contract between plaintiff and Francis
Parker. The evidence at trial also established that
Joanne Deckman spoke with Cotton on January 13, 1989, regarding his
implementation of a protective plan that would allow plaintiff to continue
teaching following the allegations of sexual abuse. Two weeks later, on January
27, 1989, Deckman wrote a letter to Cotton, informing him that, in the opinion
of the Department of Children and Family Services, credible evidence existed to
support the allegations of sexual abuse against plaintiff. Cotton,
nevertheless, allowed plaintiff to continue teaching. It was not until Golden telephoned Harris in
late February 1989 that the situation at Francis Parker began to change. The
evidence established that, after speaking with Golden, Harris called Cotton and
recommended that plaintiff be placed on a paid leave of absence. His
recommendation was adopted, and plaintiff was placed on a paid leave of absence
for the remainder of the school year. Plaintiff was terminated several months
later. Although Cotton may have made the final decision
to fire plaintiff, the disclosure by Golden to Harris could still have been
found to have been a cause of his termination. See Bentley v. Saunemin
Township, 83 Ill. 2d 10, 17, 413 N.E.2d 1242, 1246 (1980). In short,
plaintiff introduced sufficient evidence for the jury to find the element of
breach. II A Defendants next contend the circuit court erred
in refusing to direct a verdict affirming that Golden was conditionally or
qualifiedly privileged to act as she did. A conditional or qualified privilege
requires, among other things, proof of good faith. 12 Illinois Jurisprudence,
Personal Injury & Torts §17:62 (1994). However, a fundamental
element in an action for false light is actual malice. Kolegas,
154 Ill. 2d at 17-18, 607 N.E.2d at 207. Good faith and actual malice
cannot coexist. They are mutually exclusive. See 1 M. Polelle & B. Ottley,
Illinois Tort Law §5.42 (2d ed. 1999). As previously noted, plaintiff established the
existence of actual malice on the part of Golden. Accordingly, defendants have
shown no error in the denial of their motion for a directed verdict on the issue
of conditional or qualified privilege. B Defendants also argue the circuit court erred in
refusing to direct a verdict or grant their motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict affirming their immunity pursuant to the Illinois Mental Health and
Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act (Act) (740 ILCS 110/1 et
seq. (West 1998)). Section 11 of the Act provides immunity to
social workers in connection with certain good-faith disclosures. 740 ILCS
110/11 (West 1998). Section 11 further provides a presumption that social
workers act in good faith in making such disclosures. 740 ILCS 110/11 (West
1998). That presumption, however, may be overcome by a showing of bad faith. See
Lehman v. Stephens, 148 Ill. App. 3d 538, 551-52, 499 N.E.2d 103, 112
(1986). As previously determined, the evidence
introduced at trial was sufficient for the jury to find that Golden acted with
actual malice or bad faith such that the presumption of good faith within
section 11 of the Act was overcome. Accordingly, defendants have shown no error
in the denial of their motion for a directed verdict nor in the denial of their
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict with regard to the
issue of immunity. III Defendants further contend the circuit court
erred in refusing to dismiss both of the actions prosecuted by plaintiff.
According to defendants, each action was barred by its respective statute of
limitations. A An action for false light has a one-year statute
of limitations. 735 ILCS 5/13-201 (West 1998). However, such a
limitations period will not be deemed to have commenced until such time a person
knows, or reasonably should have known, of his or her injury and that such
injury was wrongfully caused. Knox College v. Celotex Corp., 88 Ill. 2d
407, 415, 430 N.E.2d 976, 980 (1981). The evidence at trial established that Golden
telephoned Harris in February 1989. Plaintiff did not file his action for false
light until 1993, four years later. However, the evidence also reveals that
plaintiff did not know, and had no reason to know, of the false statements made
by Golden to Harris until the latter was deposed in 1993. Nothing in the
evidence before the jury established that, before such time, plaintiff was aware
Golden had spoken with Harris in February 1989 or that she had lied to Harris
during their conversation. Accordingly, the circuit court cannot be said to have
erred in refusing to dismiss the action against defendants for false
light. B An action for tortious interference with a
contractual relation has a five-year statute of limitations. Best Coin-Op,
Inc. v. Paul F. Ilg Supply Co., 189 Ill. App. 3d 638, 656, 545 N.E.2d 481,
493 (1989). On April 22, 1998, prior to trial, plaintiff
sought leave to amend his complaint to add the February 1989 telephone call from
Golden to Matyas as an additional basis for his action against defendants for
tortious interference with a contractual relation. Defendants argue that by
adding this call "as a predicate act in support of his tortious interference
claim, [plaintiff] alleged a new and different occurrence as a basis for the
claim." According to defendants, by filing that amended complaint in 1998,
plaintiff eliminated the original complaint, thus placing his action for
tortious interference with a contractual relation outside the five-year statute
of limitations. The circuit court, however, did not grant
plaintiff leave to amend his complaint as requested. As a result, this
contention is without merit. IV Defendants also assert they were prejudiced by
several erroneous evidentiary rulings made by the circuit court. An abuse of discretion standard applies when
reviewing the evidentiary ruling of a circuit court. Grewe v. West
Washington County Unit District No. 10, 303 Ill. App. 3d 299, 306, 707
N.E.2d 739, 744 (1999). The evidentiary rulings at issue were sound and
reasonable. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion. V Defendants also contend the circuit court erred
in denying their motion for a mistrial. According to defendants, they were
prejudiced by the inappropriate speeches and other testimony given by opposing
counsel during trial. "A mistrial should be declared only as the
result of some occurrence of such character and magnitude that a party is
deprived of its right to a fair trial, and the moving party must demonstrate
actual prejudice as a result of the ruling or occurrence." Baker v. CSX
Transportation, Inc., 221 Ill. App. 3d 121, 138, 581 N.E.2d 770, 782
(1991). The decision to deny a motion for a mistrial is committed to the sound
discretion of a circuit court. Maple, 151 Ill. 2d at 455, 603 N.E.2d at
513. Only when that discretion is shown to have been abused will such a decision
be disturbed on appeal. Maple, 151 Ill. 2d at 455, 603 N.E.2d at
513. The record on appeal discloses no
prejudice to defendants flowing from the conduct of opposing counsel. Indeed,
the record on appeal establishes that the circuit court sustained the objections
advanced by defendants and also admonished opposing counsel against such
conduct. In short, the circuit court remedied any misconduct. There was no
error, therefore, in the denial of defendants' motion for a mistrial. VI Next, defendants maintain the circuit court made
several errors in connection with its instruction of the jury. According to
defendants, those errors entitle them to a new trial. A Defendants specifically argue the circuit court
erred in instructing the jury that, in order to be a proximate cause of the
damages suffered by plaintiff, plaintiff need not prove their conduct was the
sole cause of his damages but, rather, that such conduct "concur[red] with some
other cause acting at the same time which[,] in combination with it[,] cause[d]
the damage." According to defendants, it is not enough their actions could be
shown to have contributed to the damages to plaintiff. Their actions, argue
defendants, must be shown to have been the cause of those damages. Defendants, however, provide no authority
supporting this contention. It is therefore waived. Saldana v. Wirtz Cartage
Co., 74 Ill. 2d 379, 386, 385 N.E.2d 664, 667 (1978). Moreover, given that
there can be more than one proximate cause of an injury (Bentley, 83
Ill. 2d at 17, 413 N.E.2d at 1246), the circuit court cannot be said to have
erred in giving the aforementioned jury instruction. B Defendants also argue the circuit court erred in
instructing the jury that the element of "before the public" in an action for
false light may be established by evidence that false and highly offensive
information was communicated "to a person or persons with whom the plaintiff has
a special relationship." As previously noted, the element of before the
public in an action for false light may be established by just such a
communication. The circuit court, therefore, correctly instructed the jury as to
that element. C Defendants further argue the circuit court erred
in refusing to give the jury a comprehensive instruction in connection with the
action for tortious interference with a contractual relation. The circuit court correctly instructed the jury
with regard to the action for tortious interference with a contractual relation.
Accordingly, defendants can demonstrate no prejudice in the refusal of their
comprehensive instruction. Neither can defendants demonstrate any prejudice
in the refusal of their special interrogatories. Of the two interrogatories
proffered by defendants, the first did not correctly state the law with regard
to the element of "before the public" in an action for false light. As for the second interrogatory, defendants
sought therein to question the jury on each of the elements required in an
action for tortious interference with a contractual relation. Two of those
elements were duly addressed in other special interrogatories given to the jury.
The remaining elements addressed in that second interrogatory have been
expressly conceded by defendants on appeal. Accordingly, any contention of error
in connection with the refusal of that interrogatory has been waived for
purposes of appeal. VII Lastly, defendants contend the circuit court
erred in refusing to reduce the jury award to plaintiff by $127,000, the amount
plaintiff received in a settlement of his action against Francis Parker for lost
past wages. According to defendants, plaintiff may be compensated only once for
his lost past wages and, therefore, the jury award, which included such wages,
should have been reduced by the amount of the prior settlement. At trial, plaintiff introduced the testimony of
Jack Skeels, an economics professor at Northern Illinois University. Skeels
calculated the past wages lost by plaintiff as a result of his wrongful
termination from Francis Parker. Skeels factored the settlement received by
plaintiff from Francis Parker into his calculation, and the jury was made aware
of that consideration. Under these circumstances, the jury award will
not be reduced. Indeed, to allow such a reduction would leave plaintiff less
than whole. VIII As previously noted, plaintiff has also
appealed. Plaintiff, however, confines his appeal to a single contention.
Plaintiff contends the circuit court abused its discretion in prohibiting the
issue of punitive damages to go before the jury. Punitive damages may be awarded in actions
characterized by fraud or actual malice, or in actions in which "'defendant acts
willfully, or with such gross negligence as to indicate a wanton disregard of
the rights of others.'" Martin v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 163 Ill.
2d 33, 80-81, 643 N.E.2d 734, 757 (1994), quoting Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc.
74 Ill. 2d 172, 186, 384 N.E.2d 353, 359 (1978). Actions for false light
are no exception. Bryson v. News America Publications, Inc., 174 Ill.
2d 77, 109-11, 672 N.E.2d 1207, 1224-25 (1996). Indeed, like an action for
defamation of a public official, evidence sufficient to establish actual malice
on the part of a defendant entitles a plaintiff in an action for false light to
have his or her request for punitive damages considered by the trier of fact.
See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 160-62, 18 L. Ed. 2d
1094, 1114-15, 87 S. Ct. 1975, 1994-95 (1967); Gibson v. Philip Morris,
Inc., 292 Ill. App. 3d 267, 279, 685 N.E.2d 638, 647-48 (1997);
Krasinski v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 208 Ill. App. 3d 771, 773-74,
566 N.E.2d 998, 999-1000 (1991); Winters v. Greeley, 189 Ill. App. 3d
590, 598-600, 545 N.E.2d 422, 424-29 (1989). At the close of all the evidence, the jury
deliberated and then returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff. As part of that
verdict, the jury determined that defendants had acted with actual malice. That
determination entitled plaintiff to have his request for punitive damages
considered by the jury. The circuit court, however, refused to allow the jury to
consider that request. That was error. Indeed, upon accepting the verdict, the
circuit court was without authority to preclude the jury from further
considering the issue of punitive damages. Plaintiff had established the actual
malice of defendants. He was therefore entitled to have the jury consider his
request for punitive damages. This is not to say that a jury is required to
award a plaintiff such damages. To the contrary, punitive damages are never
awarded as a matter of right. Winters, 189 Ill. App. 3d at 599, 545
N.E.2d at 428. Nor is a jury ever obligated to award punitive damages,
no matter how egregious the conduct of a defendant. Smith v. Wade, 461
U.S. 30, 52, 75 L. Ed. 2d 632, 648-49, 103 S. Ct. 1625, 1638 (1983). CONCLUSION For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the
judgment of the circuit court in all respects but one. We reverse the decision
of the circuit court precluding the jury from considering the issue of punitive
damages. This matter is accordingly remanded to the circuit court for a trial
solely on the issue of punitive damages. Affirmed in part and reversed in part; remanded
with directions. GREIMAN, J., concurs. QUINN, J., dissents. JUSTICE QUINN dissenting: I respectfully dissent. The majority correctly
states that the statute of limitations for the tort of false light invasion of
privacy is one year. 735 ILCS 5/13-201 (West 1998). They are also correct that a
limitations period will not be deemed to have commenced until such time a person
knows, or reasonably should have known, of his or her injury and that such
injury was wrongfully caused. Knox College v. Celotex Corp., 88 Ill. 2d
407, 415, 430 N.E.2d 976, 980 (1981). However, the Supreme Court's opinion
continued "(a)t that point the burden is upon the injured person to inquire
further as to the existence of a cause of action." (Emphasis in the
original) Knox College, 88 Ill. 2d at 416. In the instant case, plaintiff was certainly
aware of his injury on the date he was terminated, July 18, 1989. The majority
assert that plaintiff had no reason to know of the false statements made by
Golden to Harris in February 1989 until Harris was deposed in 1993. However,
Mrs. Poulos testified that on February 17, 1989, she and her husband met with
Golden. It was during this meeting that Golden allegedly told the Pouloses that
if she was a parent she would not want Steve around her child. When Mrs. Poulos
said the school had made their decision, Golden replied, "(w)e'll see about
that." Golden then took a copy of Steve's teacher's contract. Further, during a
deposition, Steve testified that before he was terminated, he believed that
Golden had spoken to parents of children at the school. Under the common law discovery rule, the accrual
of the cause of action does not await the awareness by the plaintiff that he
actually has a cause of action; the statute of limitations begins to run when a
reasonable person possesses sufficient information to be put on inquiry to
determine whether a cause of action exists. Benton v. Vonnahmen, 288
Ill. App. 3d 199, 205-06, 674 N.E.2d 1270, 1275 (1997). At the time of his
termination on July 18, 1989 Poulos was certainly aware of his injury and that
it was wrongfully caused. He was also aware that Golden had expressed an
intention to review the school's decision to allow him to continue to teach. The
fact that Poulos did not depose Harris until 1993 does not relieve Poulos of his
responsibility to discover against whom he had a cause of action. Poulos' action
based on false light invasion of privacy was filed years after the statute of
limitations had expired and it should have been dismissed. Even if I did not believe that Poulos' complaint
of false light invasion of privacy was time-barred, I would reverse the jury's
verdict on that count on other grounds. "In recognizing the tort of false light,
the Illinois Supreme Court...reasoned that 'the outrageous character of the
publicity comes about in part by virtue of the fact that some part of the matter
reported was false and deliberately so.' " Kirchner v. Greene, 294 Ill.
App. 3d 672, 683, 691 N.E.2d 107, 116 (1998), quoting Lovgren v. Citizens
First National Bank, 126 Ill. 2d 411, 423, 534 N.E.2d 987 (1989). The only
statement by Golden that plaintiff alleges to be false is her statement to
Harris that the culture taken from Daniel was a "definite positive" for the
presence of gonorrhea. The majority asserts that the jury may have interpreted
the word "definite" as an assurance by Golden that there was absolutely no
possibility that the lab result was in error and this placed plaintiff in a
false light. The majority also asserts that the fact that Golden knew that
Daniel's second exam was negative for gonorrhea at the time she spoke to Harris
was a basis for the jury to find Golden acted with actual malice. The facts
simply do not support either of these assertions. As a result of the DCFS investigation into the
allegations made by R.F., the Pouloses contacted a lawyer. Based on that
lawyer's suggestion, the Pouloses took Daniel to Dr. Linda Lang for evaluation.
A laboratory test performed on Daniel came back positive for oral gonorrhea. Dr.
Lang reported this result to DCFS, as she was required by statute. Soon after
this exam, Kathy Poulos took Daniel to Virginia without notifying DCFS. She only
returned Daniel to Illinois after a Juvenile Court judge issued an arrest
warrant. While they were gone, Daniel was treated with antibiotics, ostensibly
for an ear infection. It was after this treatment that Daniel was re-tested for
gonorrhea. It was this second test which was negative. Under these
circumstances, the second negative test does not in any way negate the first
positive test. Indeed, had Daniel not been given antibiotics and a second test
been negative, this still would not mean that the first test was not positive.
There is absolutely no evidence in the record indicating that the first test
result was anything but positive. The fact that Golden described this positive
test result as a "definite positive" is the sole basis upon which the jury found
Golden liable for false light. To hold that such a description of the positive
test result is a deliberate falsehood (as required under Lovgren and
Kirchner) is manifestly erroneous. If the verdict in this case is allowed to stand,
social workers will need to constantly consider the threat of harassing lawsuits
as well as the best interests of the children they are to protect. Several
courts of review have recognized this concern. In Darryl H. v. Coler,
801 F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1986) the court upheld the grant of
summary judgment for caseworkers from the Illinois Department of Children and
Family Services. The caseworkers had conducted visual inspections of the
unclothed bodies of children to determine whether they had been abused. The
Seventh Circuit opinion held that the caseworkers were protected from damage
liability even if the physical examinations themselves may have been
unconstitutional. In Landstrom v. Illinois Department of
Children & Family Services, 892 F.2d 670 (7th Cir. 1990),
the court similarly upheld the dismissal of a suit brought by parents against a
social worker and school personnel. The defendants had physically examined a
student and questioned the student and her sister to determine if the student
had been abused. These actions were taken in spite of the fact that the father
objected to the examination and questioning. In Zamstein v. Marvasti, 692 A.2d 781
(Conn. 1997), the Connecticut Supreme Court held that a psychiatrist who had
performed an evaluation on children to determine whether they had been sexually
abused owed no duty to the father even though he had been cleared of criminal
charges in the case. "(I)mposing such a duty creates too high a risk
that, in close cases, mental health professionals would conclude that no sexual
abuse had occurred because they feared potential liability to the suspected
abusers, rather than because of their professional judgment that, in all
likelihood, no abuse had occurred. Because '[r]ules of law have an impact on the
manner in which society conducts its affairs'; Maloney v. Conroy, 208
Conn. 392, 403-404, 545 A.2d 1059 (1988); we conclude that the sounder judicial
ruling is to hold that no such duty exists." Zamstein, 692 A.2d at
787. In Whaley v. State, 956 P.2d 1100,
(Wash. App. Div. 1 1998), the court held that the statutory immunity for persons
who made good faith reports of suspected child abuse was not limited to the
initial report. The supplying of further information to follow up the initial
report was protected by the same qualified immunity, though the information
reported may have been incomplete or inaccurate. Whaley, 956 P.2d at
1106. Other jurisdictions have found social workers
liable for damages arising from their actions taken in response to allegations
of child abuse which were subsequently shown to be false. However, the factual
basis upon which those social workers acted were uniformly outrageous when
compared to the actions of Golden in the case sub judice.
Here, even though they were aware of the second
test result, DCFS "indicated" Poulos, finding probable cause that he sexually
abused his son, Daniel. On January 18, 1989 the Juvenile Court held a custody
hearing. After hearing from witnesses, including testimony regarding the
negative test result, the Juvenile Court found credible evidence that Daniel had
been abused and gave DCFS temporary custody. That night Daniel was taken to
LaRabida Hospital where Nancy Golden first met Daniel and had contact with the
Pouloses. Further, it was only after Golden was told by
Mrs. Poulos that the Francis Parker administration had not implemented a
protective plan on behalf of their students that Golden called Harris. This
information directly contradicted the assurances Cotton had given DCFS. In
reviewing the conversation between Harris and Golden, I do not believe that
Golden made any false statements. Golden's statement that she felt "that people
who were guilty of such child abuse should not be teaching children" is not
false, nor does it put Poulos in a false light. Also, since Golden's statements
to Harris were not false, they were not made with actual malice. Kolegas v.
Heftel Broadcasting Corp., 154 Ill. 2d 1, 17-18, 607 N.E.2d 201 (1992).
Similarly, the truthful statements made by Golden are not evidence of bad faith.
For this reason the presumption of good faith within section 11 of the Illinois
Mental Health and Development Disabilities Confidentiality Act was not overcome.
740 ILCS 110/1 et seq. (West 1998). In addition to finding Golden's statements to be
conditionally privileged, I would also reverse the jury's verdict on the
complaint alleging tortious interference with a contractual relation on other
grounds. The evidence, instructions, and arguments regarding the false light
invasion of privacy claim so permeated the trial on both counts that its verdict
should not stand. To prevail on this count, Poulos had to prove that Golden's
statements were a proximate cause of his termination. Both Cotton and Harris
testified that Golden's statements were not the cause, but rather, Poulos was
terminated after numerous parents called to complain regarding his continued
teaching and after Poulos failed to clear his name prior to July 18, 1989. It
was at this point that Cotton had to offer a teaching contract to a replacement
teacher. Cotton testified that in addition to the parents, he had been contacted
by DCFS and an assistant State's Attorney regarding the allegations against
Poulos. As to the source providing the information to the parents, Poulos
testified that he had told numerous people of the allegations. I also strongly disagree with the majority's
holding that the trial court erred in refusing to allow the jury to consider the
issue of punitive damages. The initial decision whether punitive damages may be
imposed in a particular case is a matter usually reserved to the circuit court
and its decision will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Proctor
v. Davis, 291 Ill. App. 3d 265, 285, 682 N.E.2d 1203 (1997). The majority
correctly cites Bryson v. News America Publications, Inc., 174 Ill. 2d
172, 186, 384 N.E.2d 353, 359 (1996) for the proposition that punitive damages
may be awarded in actions for false light invasion of privacy. The court in
Bryson pointed out that it had not yet considered whether, as a matter
of state law, punitive damages may be awarded in a defamation action absent a
showing of actual malice. Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 110. Further, in
Bryson, the court cited Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761, 86 L. Ed. 2d 593, 604, 105 S.Ct. 2939,
2946 (1985) for its holding that the first amendment of the federal Constitution
does not bar states from awarding private individuals presumed and punitive
damages in a defamation action upon a showing of less than actual malice where
the statements in question do not involve matters of public concern. Bryson,
174 Ill. 2d at 109. I believe that allegations of child abuse against a
grammar school teacher are a matter of public concern. Based on Bryson
and Dun & Bradstreet, I think it is clear that for Poulos to
be awarded punitive damages, he had to prove actual malice on the part of
Golden. While the jury found this to be so, their finding was based on the
erroneous premise that Golden's statement concerning a "definite positive" was
false. In Gibson v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 292
Ill. App. 3d 267 685 N.E.2d 638 (1997), another case cited by the majority,
Gibson sued his employer for defamation and wrongful discharge because his
supervisors had accused him of stealing company property and selling it for
personal profit. This court affirmed an award for punitive damages, saying
"(t)he statements were not the result of an investigation but were gratuitous
gossip maliciously conjured into a reason for discharge." Gibson, 292
Ill. App. 3d at 280. The court also agreed that $1 million in punitive damages
"was needed to adequately bring this matter to defendant Phillip Morris'
attention." Gibson, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 280. In the instant case, the
statements complained of were the result of an investigation by DCFS based on
evidence supplied by plaintiff's own physician. Further, while a cigarette
company may need a large damage award to get their attention, a social worker
and social service agency certainly do not. In reviewing a punitive damages
award, reviewing courts should consider the nature and the enormity of the
wrong, the financial status of the defendant, and the potential liability of the
defendant. Deal v. Byford, 127 Ill. 2d 192, 204, 537 N.E.2d 267
(1989). Punitive damages are similar to criminal
penalties. Proctor v. Davis, 291 Ill. App. 3d at 285. Because of their
penal nature, punitive damages are not favored in the law, and courts must be
cautious in seeing that they are not improperly or unwisely awarded. Deal,
127 Ill. 2d at 203. I firmly believe that any punitive damage award in this
case would be most unwise. It would be impossible to overestimate the chilling
effect such an award would have on persons responsible for making decisions on
which notifications to make in child abuse cases. As our supreme court said in Kolegas:
"The purpose underlying the false light cause of action is to define and
protect an area within which every citizen must be left alone." Kolegas,
154 Ill. 2d at 18. To hold that a social worker and a social service agency
acting within the scope of their assigned duties are subject to liability on
claims of false light invasion of privacy and tortious interference with a
contractual relation and for punitive damages on the facts present in this case
is a grave error. 1. šThe special relationship exception announced in
Miller, and now adopted by this court, has been limited in recent
decisions. E.g., Doe, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 842-43, 707 N.E.2d at
221-23; Roehrborn, 277 Ill. App. 3d at 184-85, 660 N.E.2d at 182-83.
Those decisions, each involving an action for public disclosure of private
facts, excluded from the special relationship exception those persons
who have a natural and proper interest in learning such true, albeit highly
offensive, private facts. However, the limitation applied in Doe and Roehrborn has no
relevance in a false light action. Indeed, it defies logic to suggest, as
defendants do, that a person with whom a plaintiff has a special relationship
may have a natural and proper interest in learning information about the latter
which is not only highly offensive but also false. That limitation is not
adopted.
STEVE POULOS,
Appeal from the Circuit Court
of Cook County.
STEVE POULOS,