2016 IL App (2d) 150275WC-U

Order filed February 8, 2016

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IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT

WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION DIVISION

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| RAMONA DAVIS, | ) | Appeal from the Circuit Court |
| | ) | of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, |
| | ) | Winnebago County, Illinois |
| Appellant, | ) | |
| | ) | |
| v. | ) | Appeal No. 2-15-0275WC |
| | ) | Circuit No. 14-MR-731 |
| | ) | |
| ILLINOIS WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, *et al.*, (Winnebago County State's Attorney, Appellees). | ) | Honorable Eugene Doherty, Judge, Presiding. |

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PRESIDING JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Hoffman, Hudson, Harris, and Stewart concurred in the judgment.

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**ORDER**

¶ 1 *Held*: The Commission's finding that the claimant failed to prove that she sustained work-related repetitive trauma injuries that caused or aggravated her bilateral carpel tunnel syndrome was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 2 The claimant, Ramona Davis, filed an application for adjustment of claim under the Workers' Compensation Act (Act) (820 ILCS 305/1 *et seq.* (West 2008)), seeking benefits for carpel tunnel syndrome in both of her wrists which she claimed was caused or aggravated by work-related repetitive trauma she sustained while she was employed by respondent Winnebago

County State's Attorney (employer). After conducting a hearing, an arbitrator found that the claimant had proven a work-related injury arising out of and in the course of her employment that caused her bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, with a manifestation date of November 11, 2008. The arbitrator awarded the claimant temporary total disability (TTD) benefits, permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits for 15% loss of use of each hand, and medical expenses.

¶ 3 The employer appealed the arbitrator's decision to the Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission (Commission). The Commission unanimously reversed the arbitrator's decision and denied the claimant's claim for benefits, finding that the claimant had failed to prove that she sustained repetitive trauma injuries arising out of her employment and manifesting on November 11, 2008.

¶ 4 The claimant then sought judicial review of the Commission's decision in the circuit court of Winnebago County, which confirmed the Commission's ruling.

¶ 5 This appeal followed.

¶ 6 FACTS

¶ 7 The claimant worked for the employer for approximately thirteen years as a victims advocate in the Juvenile Unit. She functioned as a liaison between the victims of crimes committed by juveniles and the prosecution. The claimant performed a variety of different job duties. For example, she was required to contact victims, meet with the families of victims, appear in court to support victims and their families, take phone calls regarding the cases, pull files, review files and evidence, and prepare various documents related to the cases she was handling.

¶ 8 The claimant testified that she worked from 8:30 a.m. through 4:30 p.m. At the beginning of her work day, the claimant received and reviewed a "detention list" (a list of arrests

of juveniles that had taken place over the previous day and night) and police reports of crimes recently perpetrated by juveniles. Typically, there were between 3 and 10 arrests reported on each detention list. The claimant would open a file for each arrest on the employer's computer system. This required the claimant to enter information into the computer regarding the juvenile along with any information she could obtain from the police report, including the specific details of the juvenile's arrest. She did this on the computer at her work station.

¶ 9 The claimant also telephoned any potential victims of the crimes allegedly committed by each juvenile. After speaking with the victims, the claimant would send each victim a "victim notification letter" which: (1) explained that the claimant would be acting as the liaison between the victim and the State's Attorney; (2) outlined the status of the case (including future court dates); and (3) identified the initial information that the claimant would need from the victim. In some instances, the claimant subsequently generated additional letters and forms, such as medical release forms and restitution summary forms, which she sent to the victims for their completion and return. Some of the letters the claimant sent to victims were form letters created from a template that was saved on the claimant's hard drive. The claimant had to input the victim's name and other case-specific information into each letter template before sending a letter out to a victim. The claimant testified that, "a lot of times" "most of the letter" needed to be changed to fit the facts of each case before she sent it to a victim. However, some of the language in the templates did not need to be changed or re-typed. Thus, the claimant generally did not need to type an entire letter from start to finish.

¶ 10 In addition to these duties, the claimant had to handle the juvenile cases that appeared on the court call each day. The claimant testified that between 1 and 25 cases appeared on the docket each day. The claimant had to pull the files for these cases and provide them to the

State's Attorney. Following each day's court appearance, the State's Attorney would return the files to the claimant. The claimant would then update the status of each case on the computer system by recording any future court dates or noting any information that needed to be obtained. The claimant would then contact any victims associated with each case (both by telephone and in writing) to inform them about what happened in court, notify them of any future court dates, and ask them to provide additional information as needed. Sometimes the claimant would have to send additional forms to the victims such as restitution request letters. When a case was resolved, the claimant sent a disposition letter to the victims explaining the outcome of the case.

¶ 11 The claimant testified that she also had to process requests for the release of evidence being held by the Rockford Police Department. She would receive 40 to 60 such requests in a single stack. For each request, the claimant would pull the physical case file and look the case up on the computer system to determine the status of the case. If the case was resolved, she would generate forms for the State's Attorney requesting that the evidence be released. She would then provide completed forms to the Rockford Police Department so it could dispose of the evidence accordingly. If the case was not yet resolved, she would produce forms that she would send to the police department explaining why the evidence could not be released.

¶ 12 The claimant also testified that, as part of her job responsibilities, she would attend victim interviews and would often accompany victims to court in DUI cases, murder cases, and felony cases in order to lend support and explain the process to the victims. The claimant stated that the amount of time she spent in court varied greatly. Later in her testimony, the claimant estimated that she spent approximately eight days per month in court, although she noted that she was assigned this duty fairly recently and that it was difficult to give a reliable estimate because her court attendance varied. While the claimant was in court, no one performed the claimant's

other work duties (such as contacting victims, writing letters, and other computer keyboarding activities) for her. When the claimant returned from court appearances, she would have to perform the same amount of office work, sometimes in only half the time she normally had to complete those tasks. Although her work tasks varied, the claimant estimated that she spent 50% of her work time at her desk, and that 50% of the time the claimant spent in her office was spent using her computer.

¶ 13 The claimant testified that, in the fall of 2008, she began to develop numbness and pain in both of her hands. Her hands hurt at work and also at night. The onset of these symptoms was gradual. On November 11, 2008, the claimant went to see Dr. William Baxter, her primary care physician. Dr. Baxter recorded a history of complaints of numbness in both of the claimant's hands. Dr. Baxter diagnosed paresthesias of the bilateral wrists, or early carpel tunnel syndrome. He ordered an EMG to be performed on both of the claimant's hands.

¶ 14 The EMG was performed by Dr. Anatoly Rozman on November 25, 2008. Dr. Rozman nterpreted the EMG findings as showing "bilateral severe sensory motor median nerve entrapment neuropathy" at the wrist with signs of focal demyelination but without signs of acute denervation. He diagnosed severe bilateral carpel tunnel syndrome and noted that the claimant's pathology was worse in her right wrist. Dr. Rozman opined that "due to the severity of the electrodiagnostic findings and signs and symptoms of carpel tunnel syndrome," the claimant should consider an "orthopedic surgery consult for possible surgical release." Dr. Baxter subsequently referred the claimant to Dr. Victor Antonacci, an orthopedic surgeon at the Lundholm Surgical Center in Rockford.

¶ 15 The claimant first saw Dr. Antonacci on January 13, 2009. Dr. Antonacci's medical record of that visit notes that the claimant had been experiencing bilateral hand symptoms since

April 2008 which worsened in September 2008. After noting the EMG findings, Dr. Antonacci recommended that the claimant wear hand braces and prescribed Aleve and B-complex vitamins. The claimant returned to Dr. Antonacci on February 10, 2009, reporting only a slight improvement in her symptoms. Although Dr. Antonacci recommended surgery at that time, surgery was postponed and the claimant continued undergoing conservative treatments.

¶ 16 The claimant saw Dr. Antonacci again on May 29, 2009. At that time, Dr. Antonacci took a history from the claimant which indicated that the claimant made a lot of repetitive motions while performing her job duties, such as typing and answering the phone. He noted that the claimant had been working in her current position for 10 to 11 years. Dr. Antonacci further noted that, initially, the claimant's hands would hurt only during her work activities. Later, however, the claimant's hands began to bother her at night when she slept. Dr. Antonacci opined that the claimant's bilateral carpel tunnel syndrome was "work-related secondary to repetitive motion and the types of activity that [the claimant] performs at work." He again recommended surgery.

¶ 17 On August 13, 2009, the claimant was examined by Dr. Jay Pomerance, an orthopedic surgeon and the employer's section 12 medical examiner. The claimant described her job duties to Dr. Pomerance, and the employer provided Dr. Pomerance a job description that classified the claimant's job as 40% sedentary. Dr. Pomerance agreed with Dr. Antonacci's diagnosis of carpel tunnel syndrome. However, Dr. Pomerance opined that the claimant's job duties neither caused nor aggravated the claimant's carpel tunnel syndrome.

¶ 18 After reviewing Dr. Pomerance's report, Dr. Antonacci wrote a causal opinion letter dated October 21, 2009. Dr. Antonacci opined that claimant's condition was work related due to repetitive motion of her hands. Although he acknowledged that it was "controversial" whether

keyboarding and computer use caused carpel tunnel syndrome, Dr. Antonacci opined that these activities are not clearly unrelated to the development of carpal tunnel syndrome in all cases. He disagreed with Dr. Pomerance that the claimant did not perform any work activities involving "factors known to cause, aggravate or accelerate a diagnosis of carpal tunnel syndrome" because of her history of over ten years of keyboarding and repetitive motion of her hands.

¶ 19 On February 7, 2010, Dr. Pomerance issued an addendum report. After reviewing additional medical records and Dr. Antonacci's October 21, 2009, causal opinion letter, Dr. Pomerance disagreed with Dr. Antonacci's causation opinion. Dr. Pomerance stated that there were no studies within the past nine years supporting a causal link between keyboarding or clerical duties and carpal tunnel syndrome.

¶ 20 On February 17, 2010, Dr. Antonacci testified via evidence deposition. Dr. Antonacci stated that, on May 29, 2009, the claimant described her job duties to him, explaining that she performed office work involving repetitive hand motions such as typing and answering the phone and that her symptoms became worse over time while working. Dr. Antonacci opined that the claimant's job duties were a contributing factor to her development of carpel tunnel syndrome. He did not believe that the claimant had any significant idiopathic risk factors for the development of carpal tunnel syndrome. Dr. Antonacci testified that "any type of wrist flexion activity that's repetitive has been known in the past to be a causative factor for carpal tunnel." He did not believe that the medical literature regarding the causal connection between keyboarding and carpal tunnel syndrome is yet definitive. In reaching his causation opinion, Dr. Antonacci assumed that the claimant did not actually type "all day." Nevertheless, he still believed that her work could aggravate her condition because of her history of performing the same job duties over time.

¶ 21 Dr. Antonacci found it very significant that, when the claimant limited her typing to ten hours per week, her symptoms improved. However, Dr. Antonacci agreed that this information came directly from Dr. Pomerance's report; Dr. Antonacci did not impose any work restrictions on the claimant preoperatively. Dr. Antonacci also agreed that someone with the claimant's physical characteristics could develop carpal tunnel syndrome irrespective of work activities.

¶ 22 Dr. Pomerance testified via evidence deposition on June 25, 2010. Dr. Pomerance outlined risk factors for the development of carpal tunnel syndrome. He opined that the claimant had certain risk factors for the development of carpal tunnel syndrome including her age, gender and body mass index. However, on cross-examination, Dr. Pomerance agreed that there was no way to prove that any particular idiopathic factors caused the claimant's carpal tunnel syndrome.

¶ 23 Dr. Pomerance testified that numerous peer-reviewed studies have not supported a relationship between keyboarding and carpal tunnel syndrome and that "the basic tenet of typing and carpal tunnel syndrome has been shown to be incorrect." He disagreed with Dr. Antonacci's opinion that repetitive flexion and extension of the wrist could cause or contribute to carpal tunnel syndrome. He explained that the literature supports a causal relation only to repetitive hyperflexion and hyperextension, where the wrist is subject to an extreme range of motion of at least 60 to 70 degrees, which causes pressure in the carpal canal approaching pathologic levels. He testified that the literature clearly supported his opinion that there is no relation between keyboarding or data entry and carpal tunnel syndrome.

¶ 24 On June 3, 2010, Dr. Antonacci performed carpel tunnel release surgery on the claimant's right hand. On July 13, 2010, Dr. Antonacci released the claimant to return to work full duty and discharged her from care with regard to her right carpel tunnel syndrome. On October 7, 2010, Dr. Antonacci performed carpel tunnel release surgery on the claimant's left hand. The claimant

progressed well after that surgery, and she returned to work on November 19, 2010.

¶ 25 The claimant testified that, after her carpel tunnel release surgeries, she returned to work in her regular capacity and experienced almost complete resolution of her symptoms. She chooses to wear wrist braces occasionally when lifting and she practices some of the exercises she learned in physical therapy. However, she takes no medications and has not returned to Dr. Antonacci since she returned to work in November 2010.

¶ 26 The employer did not offer any evidence other than a written job description of the claimant's position. That document broadly outlined the requirements of the claimant's position but did not specifically delineate the individual tasks that the claimant had to carry out throughout her work day. It indicated that the claimant's position was 40% sedentary and that a person performing the claimant's job had to be able to work at a rapid pace. However, as the claimant admitted, the job did not require the claimant to be able to type a certain minimum number of words per minute. During her testimony, the claimant acknowledged that the employer hired secretaries to do typing and to perform other tasks and that her job was not that of a secretary.

¶ 27 The arbitrator found that the claimant sustained compensable repetitive trauma injuries to her bilateral upper extremities manifesting on November 11, 2008. Moreover, the arbitrator found that the claimant's bilateral carpel tunnel syndrome was causally related to her work-related repetitive trauma injuries. In reaching this conclusion, the arbitrator relied on Dr. Antonacci's causation opinion and rejected Dr. Pomerance's causation opinion. The arbitrator found Dr. Pomerance's opinion not credible because Dr. Pomerance did not believe that keyboarding was ever causally related to carpal tunnel syndrome. The arbitrator found this opinion contrary to precedents of our appellate court and the Commission.

¶ 28 The employer appealed the arbitrator's decision to the Commission, which unanimously reversed the arbitrator's decision. The Commission found that the claimant had failed to prove that she sustained repetitive trauma injuries arising out of her employment that caused or aggravated her bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. After considering all of the evidence, the Commission found that there was "insufficient proof that [the claimant's] job duties caused repetitive injury." Although the Commission found that the claimant testified credibly with respect to her job duties and noted that her testimony was unrebutted, it concluded that the claimant had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence "that she used her hands at work in a repetitive manner causing cumulative trauma." The Commission noted that the claimant testified that she sat at her computer 50% of the time, and that the claimant's job description in evidence indicated that the claimant's job was only 40% sedentary. The claimant's sedentary duties involved inputting data into the computer system, producing documents from forms and templates stored on her computer, reviewing files, and making telephone calls. The letters she sent to witnesses were edited to reflect the correct names, dates and relevant information. However, the Commission noted that the claimant "did not testify that she type[d] any documents from start to finish," and it noted that "there [were] no examples of documents that [the claimant] produced that [were] of any significant length." The Commission acknowledged that Dr. Antonacci found it very significant that the claimant claimed to have experienced relief when she limited her keyboarding to ten hours per week. However, the Commission noted that: (1) this information came entirely from Dr. Pomerance's report; (2) Dr. Antonacci admitted that he never put restrictions on the claimant; and (3) the claimant did not testify that she ever worked light duty.

¶ 29 The Commission agreed with the arbitrator that Dr. Pomerance's causation opinions were

not credible, and it rejected Dr. Pomerance's opinion that a claimant "could never successfully prove causal connection between certain clerical activities and carpal tunnel syndrome." However, the Commission found that that "the [claimant] in this case did in fact fail to prove such a causal nexus." The Commission ruled that, to establish a causal connection, "[m]ore than mere 'frequent' keyboarding must be shown." For example, the Commission noted the importance of factors such as "sustained hand positioning, force exerted, and the duration of continuous keyboarding." The Commission stated that the claimant's testimony was unclear as to how much time she spent typing and noted that "it was apparently difficult for [the claimant] to answer the Arbitrator's questions on this issue due to the great amount of variation in her work days." She estimated that for eight days out of any given month she attended trials where she would be sitting and supporting the witnesses and families and not performing any typing or writing. Moreover, the claimant testified that on any given day, while she may have some computer work, she may also have meetings, docket calls, or interviews to attend for portions of the day. She may be pulling and reviewing files or evidence, making phone calls, assisting prosecutors and evidence technicians, or she may be generating letters and forms and performing data entry work. The Commission found that "it appears that her keyboarding was self-paced, intermittent and interspersed with other activities."

¶ 30 Moreover, the Commission stressed that, with respect to job duties other than keyboarding, the claimant "did not testify about any lifting, gripping, exposure to vibration or force, or any awkward hand positioning." She did not describe any physical characteristics of her work environment or equipment. In sum, the Commission found that the claimant "failed to offer persuasive evidence that her job duties caused repetitive trauma resulting in carpal tunnel syndrome."

¶ 31 The claimant sought judicial review of the Commission's decision in the circuit court of Winnebago County, which confirmed the Commission's ruling.

¶ 32 This appeal followed.

¶ 33 ANALYSIS

¶ 34 The claimant argues that the Commission's finding that she failed to prove that she sustained repetitive trauma injuries arising out of and in the course of her employment that caused or aggravated her bilateral carpel tunnel syndrome is against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 35 To obtain compensation under the Act, a claimant must prove that some act or phase of her employment was a causative factor in her ensuing injuries. *Land & Lakes Co. v. Industrial Comm'n*, 359 Ill. App. 3d 582, 592 (2005). A work-related injury need not be the sole or principal causative factor, as long as it was a causative factor in the resulting condition of ill-being. *Sisbro, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n*, 207 Ill. 2d a193, 205 (2003). Thus, even if the claimant had a preexisting degenerative condition which made her more vulnerable to injury, recovery for an accidental injury will not be denied as long as she can show that her employment played a role in aggravating or accelerating her preexisting condition. *Mason & Dixon Lines, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n*, 99 Ill. 2d 174, 181 (1983); *Azzarelli Construction Co. v.. Industrial Comm'n*, 84 Ill. 2d 262, 266 (1981); *Swartz v. Illinois Industrial Comm'n*, 359 Ill. App. 3d 1083, 1086 (2005).

¶ 36 An employee who alleges injury based on repetitive trauma must "show [ ] that the injury is work related and not the result of a normal degenerative aging process." *Peoria County Belwood Nursing Home*, 115 Ill. 2d at 530; *Edward Hines Precision Components v. Industrial Comm'n*, 356 Ill. App. 3d 186, 194 (2005). In repetitive trauma cases, the claimant "generally

relies on medical testimony establishing a causal connection between the work performed and claimant's disability." *Nunn v. Industrial Comm'n*, 157 Ill. App. 3d 470, 477 (1987); see also *Johnson v. Industrial Comm'n*, 89 Ill. 2d 438, 442–43 (1982). In resolving disputed causation issues, it is the Commission's province to assess the credibility of witnesses, draw reasonable inferences from the evidence, determine what weight to give testimony, and resolve conflicts in the evidence (particularly the medical opinion evidence). *Hosteny v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm'n*, 397 Ill. App. 3d 665, 675 (2009); *Fickas v. Industrial Comm'n*, 308 Ill. App. 3d 1037, 1041 (1999). We will overturn the Commission's causation finding only when it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. *Shafer v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm'n*, 2011 IL App (4th) 100505WC, ¶ 38. A factual finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence if the opposite conclusion is "clearly apparent." *Swartz v. Industrial Comm'n*, 359 Ill. App. 3d 1083, 1086 (2005). The test is whether the evidence is sufficient to support the Commission's finding, not whether this court or any other tribunal might reach an opposite conclusion. *Pietrzak v. Industrial Comm'n*, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 828, 833 (2002).

¶ 37 "There is no requirement that a certain percentage of time be spent on a task in order for the [claimant's work] duties to meet a legal definition of 'repetitive.' " *Edward Hines Precision Components*, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 194. However, to prevail under a repetitive trauma theory, the claimant must establish that she performed "the same task in a repetitive fashion" "regularly or on a daily basis." *Williams v. Industrial Comm'n*, 244 Ill. App. 3d 204, 211 (1993). The question whether a claimant's work activities are sufficiently repetitive to establish a compensable accident under a repetitive trauma theory must be decided on a case by case basis upon the particular facts presented in each case. *Id.* at 210-11. It is the Commission's province to resolve this factual issue, and we will not disturb the Commission's determination unless it is

against it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. *Id.* at 211. A factual finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only when the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent. *Shafer*, 2011 IL App (4th) 100505WC, ¶ 38. We will not overturn the Commission's finding simply because a different inference could have been drawn. *Old Ben Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n*, 217 Ill. App. 3d 70, 84 (1991). Nor will we substitute our judgment for that of the Commission. *Id.*

¶ 38 Applying these standards, we cannot say that the Commission's causation finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence. The claimant estimated that she spent 50% of her work time at her desk, and that 50% of the time the spent in her office was spent using her computer. Thus, the Commission could have reasonably inferred that the claimant spent less than half of each day (and perhaps as little as 25% of each day) typing or otherwise using her computer. Even this estimate was unreliable, however, because the claimant performed many other job duties on a regular basis and her job duties varied dramatically from day to day and week to week. The claimant estimated that she attended trials for eight days out of any given month, and sometimes more. While attending trials, the claimant would not perform any typing or writing. Moreover, while the claimant was in her office, she performed a variety of tasks besides keyboarding. For example, she attended meetings, docket calls, and interviews, and she pulled files for the State's Attorney. Indeed, even while the claimant was sitting at her desk, she was not always typing or using her computer because she also had to review files and make phone calls to victims.

¶ 39 In addition, the written job description provided by the employer indicated that only 40% of the claimant's job was sedentary. As noted, only a portion of the claimant's sedentary duties involved typing. Further, the evidence suggested that the amount of actual typing the claimant

had to do was rather limited. The claimant testified that she inputted data into the employer's computer system and produced letters and other documents from forms and templates stored on her computer. Although she stated that, "a lot of times," "most" of a given form letter needed to be changed to fit the facts of an individual case, she generally did not have to type an entire letter from start to finish. The claimant acknowledged that the employer hired secretaries to do typing and that her job was not that of a secretary.

¶ 40 Moreover, although her written job description stated that she had to be able to work at a rapid pace, the claimant conceded that she was not required to type a certain minimum number of words per minute. In addition, as the Commission noted, the claimant based her repetitive trauma claim entirely on her keyboarding activities. She did not present any evidence regarding any other alleged repetitive activities or describe any other physical characteristics of her work.

¶ 41 Based upon the evidence presented, the Commission could have reasonably inferred that the claimant failed to establish that her keyboarding duties caused repetitive trauma which caused or aggravated her bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. The claimant bore the burden of proof on this issue, and she was unable to establish that she used her keyboard repetitively and with sufficient regularity to prove a causal connection between her keyboarding and her carpel tunnel syndrome. See *Williams*, 244 Ill. 2d at 210-11.[1]

[1] The claimant suggests that the Commission should have credited Dr. Antonacci's causation opinion, particularly given that it rejected Dr. Pomerance's opinion (which was the only expert medical opinion rebutting Dr. Antonacci's opinion). However, the Commission is not required to credit the medical opinion of an expert if it finds the opinion not credible or unreasonable in light of the evidence, even if the medical opinion is not rebutted by any other credible medical expert opinions. *Fickas*, 308 Ill. App. 3d at 1042.

¶ 42 Relying upon *Edward Hines Precision Components*, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 186, the claimant notes that "[t]here is no requirement that a certain percentage of the workday be spent on a task in order to support a finding of repetitive trauma." While that is certainly true, it does not support the claimant's position in this case. As the claimant concedes, the question of whether a claimant's work activities are sufficiently repetitive to support a claim for benefits under a theory of repetitive trauma must be decided on a case by case basis upon the particular facts presented in each case, and it is the Commission's province to resolve this factual issue. *Williams*, 244 Ill. App. 3d at 210-11. In this case, as in *Williams*, the Commission considered the evidence and properly determined that the claimant's work activities were not sufficiently repetitive. *Id.* The claimant argues that her unrebutted testimony established that she "frequently performed keyboarding or writing throughout her 13 years of employment for the [employer]." However, even assuming the truth of that statement, it does not establish that the claimant's job activities were sufficiently repetitive to establish a compensable repetitive trauma injury. See *Williams*, 244 Ill.App.3d 204, 211 (affirming Commission's denial of benefits under a repetitive trauma theory even though the claimant testified that he climbed on top of a crane five or six times per day, crawled under machinery for two to three hours per day on a daily or weekly basis, used various sledgehammers for two or three hours per day on a daily basis, and spent 30% of his time during each shift lifting heavy objects). The Commission reached a contrary conclusion, and on the record presented, we cannot say that the Commission's finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 43 CONCLUSION

¶ 44 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Winnebago County, which confirmed the Commission's decision.

¶ 45 Affirmed.