2016 IL App (2d) 150987-U
No. 2-15-0987
Order filed March 17, 2016

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IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT

In re D.B., H.B., and E.B., Minors	)	Appeal from the Circuit Court
	)	of Winnebago County.
	)	
	)	Nos. 13-JA-319
	)	13-JA-320
	)	13-JA-321
	)	
(The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Angela P., Respondent-Appellant).	)	Honorable
	)	Mary Linn Green,
	)	Judge, Presiding.

JUSTICE HUDSON delivered the judgment of the court.
Justice Jorgensen concurred in the judgment.
Justice Hutchinson specially concurred.

ORDER

¶ 1 *Held:* Pursuant to *Anders v. California*, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), appellate counsel's motion to withdraw would be allowed and the judgment of the circuit court would be affirmed where no issues of arguable merit were identified on appeal, including the court's finding that respondent was shown to be unfit by clear and convincing evidence and that it was in the best interest of the minors that respondent's parental rights be terminated.

¶ 2 I. INTRODUCTION

¶ 3 Respondent, Angela P., is the mother to three minors, D.B. (born November 28, 2011), H.B. (born October 1, 2007), and E.B. (born July 13, 2004).[1] On July 27, 2015, the circuit court of Winnebago County found respondent to be an unfit parent with respect to all three minors. Subsequently, the court concluded that the termination of respondent's parental rights was in the best interest of all three minors. Respondent then filed a notice of appeal.

¶ 4 The trial court appointed counsel to represent respondent on appeal. Pursuant to the procedures established in *Anders v. California*, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), appellate counsel has filed a motion for leave to withdraw.[2] Counsel avers that he has reviewed the record in detail, but is unable to identify any non-frivolous issues on appeal which would warrant relief by this court. Counsel has submitted a memorandum suggesting two potential issues that he determined lacked merit. Counsel further avers that he has served respondent with a copy of his motion and memorandum via first-class mail at her last-known address and that he has advised respondent of her opportunity to present additional material to this court within 30 days. The clerk of this court also notified respondent of the motion and informed her that she would be afforded an opportunity to present, within 30 days, any additional matters to this court. This time has elapsed, and respondent has not presented anything to this court.

¶ 5 The Juvenile Court Act of 1987 sets forth a bifurcated procedure for the involuntary termination of parental rights. 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 2014). Under this procedure, the

[1] On the court's own motion, we will use initials to refer to the minors.

[2] The Anders procedure has been applied to proceedings to terminate parental rights. See *In re S.M.*, 314 Ill. App. 3d 682, 685 (2000).

State must make a threshold showing of parental unfitness. *In re Adoption of Syck*, 138 Ill. 2d 255, 277 (1990); *In re Antwan L.*, 368 Ill. App. 3d 1119, 1123 (2006). If a court finds a parent unfit, the State must then show that termination of parental rights would serve the minor's best interest. See *Syck*, 138 Ill. 2d at 277; *Antwan L.*, 368 Ill. App. 3d at 1123. In his memorandum, appellate counsel presents two main issues: (1) whether the trial court's finding that respondent is an unfit parent is against the manifest weight of the evidence and (2) whether the trial court's finding that it is in the minors' best interest that respondent's parental rights be terminated is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Counsel discusses the evidence in the record and explains why he believes these issues lack merit. We have reviewed the record, and, for the reasons that follow, we grant appellate counsel's motion to withdraw and affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

¶ 6 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 7 A. Unfitness

¶ 8 Section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2010)) lists various grounds under which a parent may be found unfit. *Antwan L.*, 368 Ill. App. 3d at 1123. As the grounds for finding unfitness are independent, evidence supporting any one of the alleged statutory grounds is sufficient to uphold a finding of unfitness. *In re B'yata I.*, 2014 IL App (2d) 130558-B, ¶ 30. The State has the burden of proving a parent's unfitness by clear and convincing evidence. 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2), (4) (West 2014); *B'yata I.*, 2014 IL App (2d) 130558-B, ¶ 29. A determination of parental unfitness involves factual findings and credibility assessments that the trial court is in the best position to make. *B'yata I.*, 2014 IL App (2d) 130558-B, ¶ 29. As such, a trial court's determination of a parent's unfitness will not be reversed unless it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. *B'yata I.*, 2014 IL App (2d) 130558-B, ¶ 29. A decision

is against the manifest weight of the evidence "if a review of the record 'clearly demonstrates that the proper result is the one opposite that reached by the trial court.' " *In re Brianna B.*, 334 Ill. App. 3d 651, 656 (quoting *In re M.K.*, 271 Ill. App. 3d 820, 826 (1995)).

¶ 9 The State filed separate motions to terminate respondent's parental rights with respect to each minor. In each motion, the State set forth three grounds of unfitness: (1) failure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the minor's welfare (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2014)); (2) failure to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for the removal of the minor from her within any nine-month period after an adjudication of neglected or abused minor (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(i) (West 2014)); and (3) failure to make reasonable progress toward the return of the minor to her within any nine-month period after an adjudication of neglected or abused minor (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2014)). With respect to the last two grounds, the State listed the following nine-month periods: (1) September 6, 2013, through June 6, 2014; and (2) April 6, 2014, through January 6, 2015. For each minor, the trial court found respondent unfit on all three grounds. In the memorandum of law appellate counsel filed in support of his motion to withdraw, he argues that no meritorious argument to the contrary could be made. Appellate counsel focuses on the ground that respondent failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of the minors to her within either of the two nine-month periods alleged in the State's motions.

¶ 10 Under section 1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2014)), a parent is unfit where he or she fails to make reasonable progress toward the return of the child to her during any nine-month period following the adjudication of abuse or neglect. "Reasonable progress" means "demonstrable movement toward the goal of reunification." *In re C.N.*, 196 Ill. 2d 181, 211 (2001). "[T]he benchmark for measuring a parent's 'progress toward the return of

the child' * * * encompasses the parent's compliance with the service plans and the court's directives, in light of the condition which gave rise to removal of the child, and in light of other conditions which later became known and which would prevent the court from returning custody of the child to the parent." *C.N.*, 196 Ill. 2d at 216-17. When proceeding on an allegation under section 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 2014)), the State is required to give notice to the parent of the nine-month periods it intends to rely on at trial. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 2014). The court may only consider evidence of the parent's conduct during the relevant nine-month time period identified by the State. *In re R.L.*, 352 Ill. App. 3d 985, 999 (2004).

¶ 11 Here, the principal condition which gave rise to removal of the minors involved the condition of the family home. In this regard, the record shows that on July 16, 2013, the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services received a hotline call to report that E.B. and H.B. had been unsupervised for 40 minutes. The Rockford police department responded to the report and located the children at a neighbor's residence. The responding officer conducted a well-being check the following day and found the family home to be a danger to its occupants. At the time of the hotline call, the family had an open case due to environmental neglect, which the parents had not addressed. Among the noted safety, fire, and health hazards in the home were: (1) petrified dog feces on the basement floor; (2) clothing and debris stacked around the furnace and water heater; (3) medications, cleaning supplies, and other hazardous items unsecured and within reach of the children; (4) human feces smeared on the walls; (5) piles of dirty dishes overflowing the sink and countertops and lining the kitchen floor; (6) clothing, toys, and other debris on the stairs and throughout the hallway; and (7) an exposed ceiling in the hallway. The family also had a history of domestic violence, and respondent reported untreated depression.

The minors were removed from the residence and placed in traditional foster care. Respondent and Andre B., the biological father of all three minors, were indicated for inadequate supervision and inadequate shelter.[3]

¶ 12 On September 6, 2013, respondent stipulated to count I of each of the three-count neglect petitions filed on the minors' behalf. Count I of the petitions alleged that each minor was neglected pursuant to section 2-3(1)(a) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(a) (West 2012)) in that the minors "resided in a home that was not sanitary." The State agreed to dismiss the remaining two counts of each petition (which alleged injurious environment (see 705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2012) and lack of supervision (see 705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(d) (West 2012)) with the understanding that services would be required for all counts. The client service plan developed for respondent recommended various tasks, including parenting classes, a mental-health assessment, and a domestic-violence assessment. Respondent was also tasked with providing safe and adequate housing for the minors.

¶ 13 The first permanency-review hearing was held on March 4, 2014. At the hearing, Kelly Mickley, the caseworker at the time, reported that respondent complied with some of the services outlined in the client service plan by attending parenting classes, a mental-health assessment, and a domestic-violence assessment. In addition, respondent was compliant with and appropriate during her visits with the minors. However, Mickley testified that the condition of the home remained a concern. For instance, in her written report, Mickley noted that the home remained cluttered with potentially hazardous materials within a child's reach. The home also lacked clear pathways to allow for an emergency exit. Moreover, respondent failed to follow through with

[3] On April 16, 2015, Andre signed specific consents for the foster parents to adopt the minors.

small tasks given to her to improve the condition of the home, such as cleaning off a table. Given the condition of the home, Mickley opined that respondent had not made reasonable efforts during the review period. The court agreed with Mickley's assessment and set the permanency goal at return home within 12 months.

¶ 14 The next permanency-review hearing was held on September 5, 2014. Teressa Franklin, the caseworker at the time, testified regarding developments since the permanency-review hearing in March 2014. Franklin described respondent's visits with the minors during the review period as "rocky." She explained that although the visitation was not inappropriate, boundaries had to be established regarding acceptable conversation topics with the minors. Franklin further noted that respondent had been referred for domestic-violence classes, home relocation, and counseling for hoarding. Franklin opined that respondent had not made reasonable efforts during the review period based on her living situation. Franklin explained that there had been little progress regarding the condition of the home. Franklin testified that respondent and Andre had been asked to clean up the home, but they failed to do so. Additionally, Franklin reported that the home lacks hot water and had been "technically condemned" due to its condition. In her written report to the court, Franklin also noted that the presence of mice feces throughout the kitchen, animal urine on the carpeting, ants on the kitchen counters, and broken glass on the stairs leading to the bedrooms. Franklin opined that the home was not in a condition where the minors could be returned to respondent's care. Franklin also expressed concern that respondent had not been honest regarding domestic-violence issues in the home, Andre's drinking, or the presence of one of Andre's other children in the home. The court found that respondent made reasonable efforts during the review period, but not reasonable progress. The court maintained the permanency goal at return home within 12 months.

¶ 15 The next permanency-review hearing was held on November 25, 2014. At that time, Franklin testified that since the last hearing, respondent had "sporadically" attended counseling for domestic violence. Respondent was compliant with a referral for individual counseling and also attended 10 of 13 visits with the minors. Respondent was also referred to La Voz Latina for services related to housing and maintaining the home environment. Respondent's counselor at La Voz Latina reported that respondent was initially hesitant to engage in these services, but had since opened up. Nevertheless, in her written report to the court, Franklin noted a lack of progress in improving the home environment. Franklin observed rodents in the kitchen and noted that the home lacked hot water and heat. Respondent reported that she was staying with a friend, but all of her belongings remained in the home. Respondent also told Franklin that she would have to evacuate the home by December 2014 due to foreclosure. Following arguments by the parties, the court determined that respondent had made reasonable efforts but not reasonable progress. Further, the court found that it would be in the best interest of the minors to change the permanency goal from return home to substitute care pending court determination of termination of parental rights. On February 6, 2015, the State filed separate motions to terminate respondent's parental rights with respect to each minor, alleging the three grounds of unfitness set forth previously.

¶ 16 The unfitness portion of the termination hearing commenced on April 29, 2015. At the hearing, Franklin testified that she was the caseworker from June 2014 through December 2014. During that time, Franklin spoke to respondent about the need to clean the house and even provided her with a list of small tasks to complete. However, respondent was unable to move toward unsupervised visits with the minors or placement of the minors with her because the home never became suitable for the children. Franklin testified that toward the end of her tenure

as the caseworker, respondent began living in a one-bedroom apartment with a male friend. Respondent and her friend would alternate sleeping in the bedroom and on a couch in the apartment. Franklin acknowledged that the apartment appeared to be clean with no observable hazards. Nevertheless, Franklin opined that a one-bedroom apartment occupied by two adults was not an appropriate home for the children. Moreover, Franklin continued to recommend that respondent engage in counseling for hoarding, noting that respondent left the family home "as is" without correcting the condition that brought the minors into care or following through with services recommended to improve the condition of the home.

¶ 17 Tracy Mitchell took over as the caseworker in December 2014. Mitchell testified that from the time she became the caseworker until January 6, 2015 (the end of the second nine-month period listed in the State's motions), respondent did not successfully complete the tasks outlined in the service plan. Mitchell noted, for instance, that respondent was unable to provide a safe and stable home for the children during this time frame, as she was still residing in a one-bedroom apartment.

¶ 18 Respondent testified regarding various services she completed over the course of the case, including parenting classes, a mental-health assessment, and partner-abuse counseling. Respondent further testified that she began counseling for hoarding in June 2014 and individual counseling for issues including domestic violence and post-traumatic stress disorder late in 2014. Respondent admitted that the children came into care as a result of the condition of the family home. She acknowledged that from September 2013 through June 2014, the house remained cluttered and dangerous for the children. She also admitted that prior to attending counseling at La Voz Latina in the fall of 2014, her caseworker met with her regularly and assigned tasks related to the house. These tasks were also outlined in the client service plans provided to her.

Nevertheless, there were months when respondent did not perform any of the assigned tasks. Respondent reported that she still resides on a one-bedroom apartment, but is looking for a different place to live.

¶ 19 The foregoing evidence establishes that respondent complied with some of the tasks outlined in the service plans, and we commend her for doing so. Yet, the evidence also establishes that respondent failed to make demonstrable movement toward the goal of reunification. Significantly, during the two nine-month periods identified in the State's motions (September 6, 2013, through June 6, 2014, and April 6, 2014, through January 6, 2015), respondent failed to adequately address the condition of the family home, which was the principal condition giving rise to the removal of the minors from her care. During the relevant time periods, the home remained cluttered with potentially hazardous materials accessible to a child and lacked clear pathways to allow for an emergency exit. Rodents, rodent feces, animal urine, and ants were noted in the home. The home lacked heat and hot water at times. Respondent was provided copies of the client service plans, which included small tasks related to the home, such as cleaning off a table. The caseworker also reviewed these tasks with respondent. Yet, respondent failed to follow through with these tasks and acknowledged that months would pass when she did not perform any of the assigned tasks. Although respondent eventually moved out of the home, she left the residence "as is" without correcting the condition that brought the minors into care or following through with the services recommended to improve the condition of the home. Moreover, respondent admitted at the unfitness hearing that from September 2013 through June 2014, the home remained cluttered and dangerous for the children. In light of this evidence, we agree that counsel could not make a colorable argument that the trial court's finding that respondent failed to make reasonable progress toward the return

of the minors to her during either of the two nine-month periods set forth in the State's motions is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Quite simply, during the relevant time periods, respondent failed to adequately address the condition of the family home, which, as noted above, was the principal reason the minors were removed from her care. Since evidence supporting any one of the alleged statutory ground is sufficient to uphold a finding of unfitness, we need not address any other ground of unfitness found by the trial court. *B'yata I.*, 2014 IL App (2d) 130558–B, ¶ 30.

¶ 20 B. Best Interest

¶ 21 Having concluded that no meritorious argument could be made that the basis for the trial court's finding of unfitness is against the manifest weight of the evidence, we turn to the trial court's best-interest determination. As noted earlier, once the trial court finds a parent unfit, it must determine whether termination of parental rights is in the minor's best interest. *B'yata I.*, 2014 IL App (2d) 130558-B, ¶ 41. As our supreme court has noted, at the best-interest phase, "the parent's interest in maintaining the parent-child relationship must yield to the child's interest in a stable, loving home life." *In re D.T.*, 212 Ill. 2d 347, 364 (2004). Section 1-3(4.05) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2014)) sets forth various factors for the trial court to consider in assessing a minor's best interest. These considerations include: (1) the minor's physical safety and welfare; (2) the development of the minor's identity; (3) the minor's familial, cultural, and religious background; (4) the minor's sense of attachment, including love, security, familiarity, and continuity of relationships with parental figures; (5) the minor's wishes and goals; (6) community ties; (7) the minor's need for permanence; (8) the uniqueness of every family and every child; (9) the risks related to substitute care; and (10) preferences of the person available to care for the child. 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2014). The State bears the burden

of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the best interest of a minor. *D.T.*, 212 Ill. 2d at 366; *In re Deandre D.*, 405 Ill. App. 3d 945, 953 (2010). Like the unfitness determination, we review the trial court's best-interest finding under the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard. *B'yata I.*, 2014 IL App (2d) 130558-B, ¶ 41.

¶ 22 In the present case, the evidence considered at the best-interest phase of the termination hearing establishes that E.B. has been living with the same foster family since he was taken into care (about two years). The foster family consists of the foster parents, two other foster children, and the foster parents' nephew. Mark Westphal, the case manager at the time of the best-interest hearing, described E.B.'s relationship with the foster family as "incredible." Westphal stated that the foster family provides a loving and caring environment. E.B. gets along with the other children in the family. E.B. attends family functions, goes on family vacations, and does chores around the home. E.B. participates in an individualized education program at school because he has trouble reading, concentrating, and retaining information. The foster parents assist E.B. with his homework and attend educational meetings for E.B. E.B. has been diagnosed with various illnesses, including attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and oppositional defiant disorder. E.B. attends counseling for these conditions and is on medication. The foster parents take care of E.B.'s medical needs, food, shelter, and clothing. Moreover, E.B. participates in a variety of extracurricular activities, including church programs, cub scouts, and soccer. The foster parents have expressed interest in providing a permanent home for E.B., and, according to the guardian *ad litem*, E.B. indicated that he wants to be adopted by his foster parents. Westphal opined it would be in E.B.'s best interest to terminate respondent's parental rights.

¶ 23 Westphal further testified regarding the placement of H.B. and D.B. The record shows that H.B. and D.B. were removed from their initial placement and began residing with their

current foster family about a year ago. Westphal related that the family, which consists of the foster parents and the two minors, go on "all sorts of vacations" and participate in many activities. H.B. is doing well in school and has made friends there. H.B. recently stopped taking medication for anxiety because she no longer needs it. D.B. is too young to attend school, but will be starting preschool in the near future. D.B. had some speech issues that the foster parents have been working on with him. The foster parents ensure that H.B. and D.B. are up to date on their medical examinations. The foster parents also provide the minors food, shelter, and clothing. Westphal testified that the environment in the foster home is "great" and the minors each have their own bedrooms. According to the foster father, H.B. asked when he and his wife would be adopting her. Westphal noted that the foster parents have committed to adopting the minors and felt that it would be detrimental to their well-being to remove them from their current placement. Further, while the minors are not all placed together, the sibling bond is being preserved by sibling visits. Westphal opined that it would be in the minors' best interest to terminate respondent's parental rights.

¶ 24 While respondent has clearly maintained a bond with the children and undoubtedly loves them, it is not apparent that she can provide a safe, stable environment for them. Respondent testified at the best-interest hearing that if the minors were returned to her, she would be able to provide adequate and appropriate shelter for them. However, as noted from the evidence set forth above, respondent never improved the condition of the family home or otherwise secured appropriate housing. Moreover, according to Westphal, the minors have not indicated that they want to live with respondent. We also note that, according to Westphal, the foster parents are willing to facilitate visits between respondent and the minors. In addition, while the three minors reside in two separate foster homes, a sibling visitation plan has been developed to maintain the

bond between the three children. Given this record, we agree with appellate counsel that a non-frivolous argument cannot be made that the trial court's finding that it is in the minors' best interest that respondent's parental rights be terminated is against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 25 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 26 In sum, after carefully examining the record, the motion to withdraw, the accompanying memorandum of law, and the relevant authority, we agree with appellate counsel that no meritorious issue exists that would warrant relief in this court. Therefore, we allow the motion of appellate counsel to withdraw in this appeal, and we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Winnebago County finding respondent unfit and terminating her parental rights to the minors.

¶ 27 Affirmed.

¶ 28 JUSTICE HUTCHINSON, specially concurring.

¶ 29 I concur with the majority that respondent was correctly determined to be unfit based upon her failure to make reasonable progress toward the children's return during the designated time periods. See 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii)-(iii) (West 2014). I also concur with the majority that it was in children's best interests that respondent's parental rights be terminated. I note that the service plans prepared for respondent by the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) and its contract agencies may not have been a perfect fit for the issues adjudicated prior to the filing of petition for termination of parental rights. However, and nevertheless, the State established by clear and convincing evidence that respondent was unfit and remained unable to perform simple housekeeping chores for her and the children during the designated time periods. As the trial court found, the children were entitled to permanency and respondent's progress was not likely to achieve that result in the near future.

¶ 30 However, I write separately to address the "apparent concerns" of respondent's attorney concerning the services offered to the respondent and her children. I say "apparent concerns" because despite counsel noting his concerns he really did not raise any argument supported by authority concerning these services. Instead, counsel moved to withdraw, indicating that he was unable to identify any non-frivolous issues on appeal that would warrant relief by this court concerning the efforts and progress of respondent in her journey to have the children returned to her custody. Candidly, I share some of counsel's concerns.

¶ 31 As noted in the majority disposition, the home that respondent shared with the children and the children's father was a serious safety and health hazard. While the authorities were alerted to the family because of domestic violence and inadequate supervision issues, upon further investigation, the dangerous conditions of the home were discovered. Then, during the assessment, respondent proved unable to complete even the simple task of "cleaning a (kitchen) table." But rather than providing regular housekeeping education or helping the family find a suitable temporary housing arrangement until respondent's housekeeping skills improved, the children were removed from respondent's custody and respondent was left within the dangerous home. So, respondent took the path of least resistance when her home became uninhabitable: She moved into a one-bedroom apartment with a roommate. This arrangement clearly could not accommodate the respondent *and* the children, but this was the only thing that she knew to do or had any help doing because services offered to correct the miserable condition of the home, or to teach respondent how to correct the home's condition, were not offered.

¶ 32 Perhaps such service programs are unavailable. Then again, perhaps such programs are available, and have simply gone unfunded. As an employee of the State of Illinois, I am aware that resources have been difficult to come by for some years for agencies like DCFS and its

contract agencies. That situation has heightened in the last 18 months, and the prospect of improvement is very bleak. However, the assessment of dangerous environments for children, whether those environments involve domestic violence, alcohol or drug issues or hazardous living arrangements to mention just a few, requires reasonable, common sense people to draft an "appropriate service plan" (325 ILCS 5/8.2 (West 2014))—one which will correct the issues that caused the case to come into care. Under any reasonable definition of appropriate, that plan should identify the shortcomings of the parent(s) and identify the local, affordable providers for those services needed to address those shortcomings. Finally, the case managers should participate in the effective implementation of the plan, and not merely its review. If the plan is not appropriate, or appropriate services are simply not available (whether due to an agency's financial condition or otherwise), then it is the duty of the trial court to make findings to that effect. See 705 ILCS 405/2-28(2) (West 2014).

¶ 33 In my opinion, respondent did not receive the most appropriate services in this case. However, here, an experienced trial court judge had the ability to see beyond the deficiencies in the service plan, and given respondent's shortcomings, I simply cannot fault the trial court judge for her ultimate resolution of the issues concerning respondent's unfitness and the children's best interests. That said, since the resources for these cases are not likely to be found any time soon, it may be time for trial courts to take a much harder look at service plans and how they are implemented. Furthermore, it is time for the executive and legislative branches of this state to recognize and finance programs that provide for the wellbeing of Illinois' children.