

No. 1-14-3680

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

DAN MEI,)	Appeal from the
)	Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee,)	Cook County.
)	
v.)	No. 14 M1 710192
)	
JENNIFER HO,)	Honorable
)	Alfredo Maldonado,
Defendant-Appellant.)	Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE GORDON delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Reyes and Justice Lampkin concurred in the judgment.

O R D E R

¶ 1 *Held:* We dismiss defendant's appeal because she failed to comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rules governing appellate procedure and to provide any legal or factual bases to support her claims on appeal.

¶ 2 *Pro se* defendant Jennifer Ho appeals from the trial court's order denying her *pro se* motions to vacate an order granting possession of the second-floor apartment at 3046 South Lowe Avenue (the property) to plaintiff Dan Mei, and to quash service. On appeal, defendant contends that plaintiff's mother, Cheung Yip-Yeun Mui, was the "worst landlord" she has ever

had and that Mui and plaintiff evicted defendant despite the fact that defendant paid her rent every month. Defendant seeks an apology and compensation from Mui and plaintiff. We dismiss.

¶ 3 The limited record on appeal establishes the following facts. In May 2014, plaintiff filed, through counsel, a forcible detainer action seeking possession of the property and \$380 in rent and costs from defendant and all unknown occupants.

¶ 4 After plaintiff was unable to personally serve defendant, plaintiff's counsel filed an affidavit for service by posting, averring that defendant could not be found after diligent inquiry. On June 11, 2014, the sheriff's office posted the summons at the Cook County Government Building, City Hall and the Daley Center.

¶ 5 On June 24, 2014, the trial court entered an order of possession for the property against defendant and all unknown occupants. No monetary damages were assessed against defendant. The court stayed enforcement of the order until July 2, 2014.

¶ 6 On August 13, 2014, defendant filed three *pro se* motions. The first, a motion to vacate the order of possession, alleged that defendant paid Mui rent every month in cash, but that Mui refused to give defendant receipts. When defendant tried to pay with a money order, Mui refused to accept it. The motion stated "possession is not an issue" but "the money claim is disputed." The second, a *pro se* motion to quash service, alleged that defendant was never served and did not know about the instant proceeding. The third motion stated "possession is not an issue" and "the money claim is disputed."

¶ 7 On September 25, 2014, the trial court denied defendant's motion to vacate the order of possession because it was not timely filed within 30 days. The court also denied defendant's other motions as they failed to establish grounds for any relief.

¶ 8 Defendant then filed a *pro se* motion to reconsider alleging that she was treated unfairly by the trial court, and that plaintiff was not her landlord; rather, Mui was her landlord. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant now appeals *pro se*.

¶ 9 In the case at bar, defendant has failed to comply with our supreme court's rules governing appellate court briefs in numerous respects. The brief does not contain a proper summary statement, introductory paragraph, or statement of the issues presented for review as required by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h) (eff. Feb. 6, 2013). Most importantly, however, it contains neither citation to the record nor reference to relevant legal authority.

¶ 10 Our review of defendant's appeal is inhibited by her failure to comply with our supreme court's rules. It is well established that a court of review is entitled to briefs that conform to supreme court rules. *Schwartz v. Great Central Insurance Co.*, 188 Ill. App. 3d 264, 268 (1989) (appellants' briefs are to provide cohesive legal arguments in conformity with the supreme court rules). Here, defendant's brief is devoid of any citations to the record or legal authority (see Ill. S. Ct. R. 314(h)(7) (eff. Feb. 6, 2013)), and fails to explain what claims of error are being presented or exist on appeal. Additionally, the record on appeal does not include any reports or transcripts of the underlying proceedings and, therefore, the record could be considered inadequate to review this appeal. See, e.g., *Landau & Associates, P.C. v. Kennedy*, 262 Ill. App. 3d 89, 92 (1994) (an appeal may be dismissed absent a proper record, even in a small claims case).

¶ 11 Defendant's *pro se* status does not excuse her from complying with supreme court rules governing appellate procedure (*Coleman v. Akpakpan*, 402 Ill. App. 3d 822, 825 (2010)), and she is expected to meet a minimum standard before this court can adequately review the trial court's order (*Rock Island County v. Boalbey*, 242 Ill. App. 3d 461, 462 (1993)). This court may, in its

discretion, strike a brief and dismiss an appeal based on the failure to comply with the applicable rules of appellate procedure. *Holzrichter v. Yorath*, 2013 IL App (1st) 110287, ¶ 77.

¶ 12 Most importantly, however, defendant has failed to articulate a legal argument which would allow any meaningful review of her appeal. A reviewing court is entitled to have all the issues clearly defined, and be provided with meaningful, coherent argument and citation to pertinent authority. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Feb. 6, 2013). Defendant's brief is a narrative of the case from her perspective without any citations to the record. To the extent that this court can glean defendant's position on appeal, it appears that she wants Mui, who is not a party to this appeal, and plaintiff to apologize and compensate her for damages related to the eviction process.

¶ 13 We note that defendant appeals from the trial court's October 28, 2014, order denying her *pro se* motion to reconsider the trial court's September 25, 2014, ruling. However, defendant makes no arguments on appeal regarding this ruling; accordingly, the issue is forfeited. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Feb. 6, 2013) (points not argued are waived).

¶ 14 Ultimately, for the reasons outlined above, we find that defendant's brief is completely deficient and fails to comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rules for appellate procedure.

Although we seldom enter an order dismissing an appeal for failure to comply with supreme court rules, our sound discretion permits us to do so. *Holzrichter*, 2013 IL App (1st) 110287,

¶ 77. We therefore use that discretion to strike defendant's brief and dismiss the appeal.

¶ 15 Appeal dismissed.