No. 1-08-1798

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

SECOND DIVISION
JANUARY 18, 2011

IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,	)	Appeal from the
	)	Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee,	)	Cook County.
	)	
v.	)	No. 00 CR 22582
	)	
EDDIE RELIFORD,	)	Honorable
	)	William G. Lacy,
Defendant-Appellant.	)	Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Cunningham and Justice Karnezis concurred in the judgment.

O R D E R

HELD: Pursuant to a supervisory order entered by the Illinois Supreme Court, we reconsidered our initial judgment modifying defendant's sentences to run concurrently in light of *People v. Petrenko*, 237 Ill. 2d 490 (2010), and now conclude that the consecutive terms were not void; the trial court's judgment was affirmed.

Defendant Eddie Reliford was convicted of two counts of criminal sexual assault, armed robbery, and aggravated kidnaping.

The court imposed consecutive sentences of natural-life imprisonment on each count of criminal sexual assault, and also imposed sentences of 30 years' imprisonment for armed robbery and aggravated kidnaping, running concurrent to each other and consecutive to the life sentences. Defendant presently appeals from the summary dismissal of his *pro se* petition for relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act). 725 ILCS 5/122-1 *et seq*. (West 2008). He asserts that the trial court's judgment imposing consecutive sentences was void under the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in *People v. Palmer*, 218 Ill. 2d 148 (2006), because it is impossible to serve any sentence consecutive to a natural-life term.

We initially modified defendant's sentences to run concurrently, adhering to the prior holdings of this court that *Palmer* renders void consecutive natural-life sentences, as well as a term of years consecutive to a life sentence. Pursuant to a supervisory order entered by the Illinois Supreme Court, we have vacated our initial order, and now reconsider the matter in light of *People v. Petrenko*, 237 Ill. 2d 490 (2010), and *People v. Williams*, No. 107550 (July 15, 2010). For the reasons that follow, we conclude that a different result is warranted.

In *Petrenko*, 237 Ill. 2d at 506, the supreme court overruled that portion of *Palmer* holding that the imposition of consecutive natural-life sentences is impermissible under the mandatory

consecutive sentencing statute and natural law. In doing so, the supreme court specified that the courts of this state are to enforce section 5-8-4(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(a) (West 2000)) as written and without regard to the practical impossibility of serving the sentences it yields. *Petrenko*, 237 Ill. 2d at 506-07. Following *Petrenko*, the supreme court ruled that a prison term for aggravated kidnaping could properly run consecutive to natural-life sentences for aggravated criminal sexual assault. *Williams*, No. 107550, slip op. at 19.

After reconsidering the issue raised by defendant in light of *Petrenko* and *Williams*, we conclude that the consecutive terms of natural-life imprisonment imposed on defendant's criminal sexual assault convictions, and his consecutive 30-year terms imposed on his armed robbery and aggravated kidnaping convictions were not void, and, accordingly, affirm the dismissal of defendant's post-conviction petition.

Affirmed.