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and his inculpatory statement was unreliable.

¶ 3 Prior to the adjudication hearing, respondent filed a motion to suppress his inculpatory statement to police alleging that it was involuntary. Following the suppression hearing, the court found that his statement was voluntary, and denied the suppression motion. In doing so, the court noted that the evidence presented at the suppression hearing showed that respondent knowingly and intelligently waived his *Miranda* rights, that respondent could repeat a line of the *Miranda* warnings almost verbatim, that respondent had two family members present during the interrogation by two officers in plainclothes, that there was no improper police conduct, and that respondent had several prior arrests.

¶ 4 At the adjudication hearing, the victim, Homer Kroski, testified that at 10:45 a.m. on February 2, 2010, he returned to his home at 6308 North Kildare Avenue in Chicago, Illinois, and noticed two sets of footprints in the snow leading to each window of his house. Kroski entered his home through the back door which was locked. Once inside, he noticed that his television set had been moved from the basement to the first floor landing. Kroski then heard some rattling in his house, and yelled, "hey." While Kroski was standing in the doorway to the kitchen, he saw a man, who he identified in court as respondent, standing 12 feet away from him in his dining room. Kroski testified that he was face to face with respondent and observed him for five seconds. Respondent yelled something in a foreign language to another man in the house, then ran within a few inches of Kroski, who got a good look at him. As respondent passed him, Kroski hesitated for a minute, then ran out his back door to see which direction respondent fled. Kroski saw respondent run through his neighbor's yard, but did not get a look at the other person, who ran out the front door. Kroski called police, and back inside his home, he noticed that some of his wife's jewelry was missing. Kroski stated that he did not give anyone permission to enter his home on the date in question.

¶ 5 Kroski further testified that he told police that respondent was about 18 years old, five feet six inches tall, and white. During the trial, Kroski was shown some photographs of people who defense counsel told him were Hispanic. Kroski then told counsel that he would describe them as, "white, Hispanic."

¶ 6 Kroski further testified that on February 20, 2010, he met with Detective Dennis Pagan. The detective showed him some photographs from which he identified respondent as one of the offenders. On April 22, 2010, Kroski met with the detective at the police station where he identified respondent in a line-up.

¶ 7 Detective Pagan testified that he investigated the incident, and spoke to Kroski over the telephone a couple of days after the incident. Kroski told him that he got a good look at one of the offenders, who he later identified as respondent. The detective testified that he only recalled Kroski describing the offender as Hispanic, but his report indicated that Kroski described the offender as white, five feet eight inches tall, and eighteen years old.

¶ 8 The detective further testified that on February 20, 2010, Kroski immediately identified respondent from a photo array. There was no hesitation in his identification. On April 22, 2010, Kroski immediately identified respondent in a line-up. After the line-up identification, Detectives Pagan and Trajanes met with respondent, in the presence of his mother and sister. Detective Pagan advised respondent of his *Miranda* rights which respondent indicated that he understood and waived. During this meeting, Pagan spoke to respondent in English and his mother in Spanish based on their language preferences. Respondent told the detectives that he went inside the residence with his friend in exchange for narcotics, and took a monitor and some other items. His friend entered the house through the side door which he had forced open. When the detective showed respondent a picture of the residence at 6308 North Kildare, and asked him if that was the house in question, respondent said, "[y]es, that's the residence," and

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signed the picture.

¶ 9 Maria Medrano testified that she is respondent's mother, and from 8 a.m. to 1 p.m. on February 2, 2010, she was working with her 15-year-old son at the Hardrock Grille at 6237 North Western Avenue, in Chicago. On May 24, 2010, she met with an investigator from the Cook County State's Attorney's Office, who did not ask her where her son was on February 2, 2010, and she did not tell him that she did not know where he was on the date of the burglary. Medrano further stated that the investigator did not tell her when the incident had occurred, and she believed that her son was being accused of a crime that occurred on the day he was arrested, April 22, 2010. Medrano stated that she did not hear respondent confess to the crime, and that she did not know the actual date of the incident until the day of the trial.

¶ 10 At the close of evidence, the court found that respondent was proved delinquent of residential burglary beyond a reasonable doubt. In doing so, the court stated that it found Kroski "very clear minded and very credible, very reliable in terms of what he saw and what he didn't see." The court noted that respondent could be considered white even though he is Hispanic based on his fair complexion, and although he was 15 years old on the date of the crime and currently, he could pass for an 18-year-old. The court found that Kroski's identifications carry a great deal of weight where he had ample opportunity to observe respondent, and that the three separate identifications by Kroski were supported by respondent's confession. The court further found that the confession was voluntary with respondent's mother and sister present during it, and that the alibi can be easily explained away by Medrano's confusion about what day the incident occurred. The court determined that respondent was clearly not working at the restaurant at 11 a.m. on February 2, 2010, because he was inside Kroski's home at that time.

¶ 11 On appeal, defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to adjudicate him delinquent of residential burglary. He maintains that Kroski's identification of him and his

inculpatory statement were unreliable, and that he presented a plausible alibi defense.

¶ 12 When defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction, the proper standard of review is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. *People v. Cunningham*, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 279-80 (2004). This standard recognizes the responsibility of the trier of fact to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence and to draw reasonable inferences therefrom. *People v. Campbell*, 146 Ill. 2d 363, 375 (1992). A criminal conviction will be reversed only if the evidence is so unsatisfactory as to raise a reasonable doubt of guilt. *Campbell*, 146 Ill. 2d at 375. For the reasons that follow, we do not find this to be such a case.

¶ 13 Respondent asserts that Kroski's identification of him as the offender was unreliable as evidenced by the factors set forth in *People v. Slim*, 127 Ill. 2d 302 (1989). We disagree, and find that the factors in *Slim*: (1) the victim's opportunity to view the offender at the time of the crime; (2) the victim's degree of attention; (3) the accuracy of the victim's prior description of the criminal; (4) level of certainty of the victim at the identification confrontation; and (5) length of time between the crime and identification (*Slim*, 127 Ill. 2d at 308), weigh in favor of the reliability of the victim's identification of defendant as an offender.

¶ 14 Kroski had, as the trial court noted, ample opportunity to view respondent in that he observed him face to face for five seconds, and as he passed within a few inches of him on his way out of the residence. *People v. Rowe*, 115 Ill. App. 3d 322, 323-25 (1983). Further, Kroski's degree of attention was high where he saw respondent in his home, got a good look at his face, heard respondent yell to another person in a foreign language, and noted the direction that respondent fled. This evidence clearly shows that Kroski's attention was focused on respondent during the incident, to satisfy the first and second *Slim* factors.

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¶ 15 Kroski also demonstrated a high level of certainty that it was respondent where he identified respondent as one of the offenders on three separate occasions without hesitation, and was positive and unshaken in these identifications. Furthermore, the first identification was only 18 days after the incident, and the second was two months later.

¶ 16 Respondent, however, claims that the victim's description of him as white, and 18 years old was inaccurate where he was Hispanic and 15 years old. We note, however, that the trial court specifically noted that respondent could pass for white because he had a fair complexion, and although he was 15 years old, he could also pass for 18. In addition, discrepancies in a preliminary description do not, of themselves, generate a reasonable doubt, provided, as here, that a positive identification has been made. *Slim*, 127 Ill. 2d at 308-09. Moreover, the trial court found Kroski's identification testimony credible, and we have no basis for disturbing that determination. *People v. Hughes*, 259 Ill. App. 3d 172, 178 (1994).

¶ 17 In reaching this conclusion, we also find no reasonable doubt of respondent's identification arising from the testimony of respondent's mother, Medrano. *People v. Berland*, 74 Ill. 2d 286, 307 (1978). The familial tie clearly brought Medrano's veracity under scrutiny (*People v. Singleton*, 367 Ill. App. 3d 182, 189 (2006)), and the trier of fact was not required to accept this self-serving alibi testimony over the positive and credible identification testimony from the eyewitness (*People v. Homes*, 274 Ill. App. 3d 612, 621 (1995)).

¶ 18 In addition, the victim's identification, which by itself was sufficient to support a guilty verdict (*People v. Martinez*, 348 Ill. App. 3d 521, 529 (2004)), was also corroborated by respondent's confession. Although respondent acknowledges that his confession was admissible evidence, he contends it was unreliable, and should not have been given any weight by the trial court. This argument involves the credibility and weight of respondent's confession, a matter for the trier of fact, which clearly found the confession reliable, and we will not disturb that

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determination. *People v. Dinwiddie*, 299 Ill. App. 3d 636, 646 (1998); *People v. Schultz*, 99 Ill. App. 3d 762, 770-72 (1981). Moreover, and as noted above, the confession was corroborated by Kroski's three separate identifications of respondent and also by the evidence which showed that the house respondent confessed to burglarizing was, in fact, the house that was burglarized, and, thus, was clearly reliable. *People v. Darnell*, 94 Ill. App. 3d 830, 835 (1981). Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to allow the circuit court to find respondent proved delinquent of residential burglary beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶ 19 In light of the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.

¶ 20 Affirmed.